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Abstract  
 
Negotiations between the European Union and the Russian Federation are 
instrumental in forging fruitful and balanced cooperation between the two giants. 
However, the EU seems to run up against the same stone-walling as the United States 
did during the Cold War. Soviet negotiation style – perceiving bargaining as ‘mobile 
warfare’ – appears to be identical with the Russian mode of ‘give and take’, while EU 
negotiators tend to use less distributive and more integrative strategies and tactics. 
This collision does not make life easy. The EU is therefore well advised to try to change 
the context of the relationship whenever possible before entering substantial 
negotiations with the Russian Federation. Besides the introduction setting out Russian 
negotiation style in general, this EU Diplomacy Paper offers five case studies which 
illustrate this style in practice. They were written by students of the College of 
Europe’s  EU International Relations and Diplomacy Studies programme, Marcus 
Aurelius Promotion 2008-2009. Two cases deal with direct negotiations between 
Russia and the EU (Kaliningrad transit, new bilateral agreement), while two other 
contributions use negotiations in the field of energy to highlight Russian strategies 
and tactics (E.ON-Gazprom asset-swap, Shell and Sakhalin-II negotiations), and one 
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The Russian Federation is the most important neighbour of the European Union (EU), 
the most powerful, and the most difficult to handle. The two main reasons for this are 
the asymmetry of interdependency and the Russian negotiation style. First of all, 
there is an imbalance in the field of security. The EU is dependent on the United 
States to counterbalance Russian military power, while the Russians are not 
dependent on a third power. Secondly, the economic equilibrium is not a stable one. 
Though Russia is very dependent on EU imports and EU payments for its natural 
resources, the EU does not have the option of short-term punishment. Russian 
sanctions on oil and gas deliveries have an immediate effect on EU member states, 
while EU sanctions will only do their work in the long run. Timewise, the ‘Russian stick’ is 
more effective than the ‘EU carrot’. This is all the more true as Russia can try ‘divide 
and rule’ tactics against an inherently divided EU. This has to do with the segmented 
and democratic character of the EU vis-à-vis a centralised, autocratic Russia. Then 
there is the question of culture.  
  
It is difficult to determine EU culture; actually, there is no single EU culture. Indeed, we 
can distinguish EU systemic, political and bureaucratic culture. But societal culture is 
just a basket of Western, Central and Southern European cultures, where one might 
want to add Northern and perhaps Eastern European cultures as well (though they 
can also be seen as subsets of Western and Central European value systems). Maybe 
we could determine a European civilisation, but for sure the Russians would claim 
they are part of that. And there are good historical and other reasons to defend that 
position. In fact, the European civilisation stretches far beyond the European 
subcontinent, to Siberia and the Americas. In any case, one of the expressions of 
cultural differences between the European cultures within the European civilisation is 
negotiation style.  
 
Russian Negotiation Style?  
We may define negotiation style in terms of individual personal character or as the 
expression of national culture in the behaviour of negotiators. Research into the 
Russian negotiation style as collective behaviour is quite limited because Russian 
national culture has not been included in a comprehensive study like Geert 
Hofstede’s  Culture’s Consequences. 1 He has estimated values, but due to the 
secretive character of the Soviet system, Russian style has not been included in the 
                                                 
1 Geert Hofstede, Culture’s Consequences, Beverly Hills, Sage Publishers, 1980.  
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wave of cultural surveys in the second part of the twentieth century. One of the few 
sources is Hans Binnendijk’s edited volume National Negotiation Styles. Although the 
chapter by Leon Sloss and M. Scott Davis deals with the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics’ negotiation style, can we to a great extent translate this into Russian 
negotiation style.2 First of all, the Russians and foremost Russian culture dominated 
the USSR. Secondly, all the Soviet styles mentioned in Binnendijk’s book can be found 
in the negotiation styles of the present-day Russian Federation. All five cases in this EU 
Diplomacy Paper bear witness to that, though in one of them it is the exception that 
seems to prove the rule. 
 
Sloss and Davis start their exposé with the“burden of history”.3 T h a t  b u r d e n  i s ,  o f  
course, the same for the Soviet Union as it is for the Russian Federation: the feeling 
that nature and mankind are a threat to the survival of the peoples between Poland 
and the Pacific. Therefore, trust is an issue, as is the willingness to give in. In a harsh 
political and environmental climate trust is a precious thing and tough defence an 
absolute necessity. Remember the Mongols! And not only them, the Huns and the 
Turks, but also the Poles and the Germans, Catholicism and Islam. The fear of being 
overwhelmed seems to be an important drive in the strategy to keep everybody at a 
distance, for example through imperialism. Sure, this is stereotyping, but it is in line 
with the experiences noted by many Western negotiators, as well as the case studies 
in this paper. These observations are also in line with my own experiences, both with 
students – but certainly not all! – in my classes in Eastern Europe, but also in my 
dealings with some Russian researchers of international negotiation processes . 
 
The second main factor mentioned by Sloss and Davis is “revolutionary ideology”.4 
Here we will find a difference between the Soviet and the Russian Federation 
negotiation styles, but I argue that revolutionary rhetoric was only a sauce over 
Russian behaviour. Indeed, the tactics mentioned in Binnendijk’s book and those 
recorded by the authors in this paper are similar. It seems very likely that Soviet style 
has been Russian style in the end. Especially as the third main underlying factor 
mentioned by Sloss and Davis is an “oligarchical decision-making system”.5 We could 
have had our doubts about this under President Yeltsin, but not under Putin. There 
might be some changes under Medvedev, perhaps, but these signals are still very 
weak.  
  
                                                 
2   Leon Sloss and M. Scott Davis, The Soviet Union, in Hans Binnendijk (ed.), National 
Negotiation Styles, Washington, D.C., Centre for the Study of Foreign Affairs of the Foreign 
Service Institute, US Department of State, 1987. 
3 Ibid., p. 17. 
4 Ibid., p. 20. 
5 Ibid., p. 21. 
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Sloss and Davis describe the following tactics, shaping the Russian profile:6 
1.  a preference for generally worded agreements and the tendency to equate 
compromise with weakness;  
2.  a drive to promote a broad range of interests at the same time, thereby 
strengthening the Russian position through package deals between issues 
where the Russians have stronger and weaker positions; 
3.  careful preparation – and the Russian diplomatic education is one of the best 
in the world – while manipulating its environment as much as possible;  
4.  a tendency to instruct Russian negotiators very tightly – which is in line with the 
extremely dominant role of leaders and bosses in Russian society – in a steep 
hierarchical order; 
5.  a combative negotiation style, confrontational – blunt – stubborn: negotiation 
is war by other means; 
6.  divide and rule, being very patient if needed, a love for ‘drama’; 
7.  very skilled in secretive and back-channel negotiation. 
 
Jerrold L. Schecter, in his book Russian Negotiation Behaviour7, comes to similar 
conclusions. “Byzantine and Mongol rule served as models for Russia”8 and these 
examples of authoritarian statecraft highlighted the importance of authority, power 
and submission. Schecter deplores the fact that Moscow prevailed over Novgorod, 
which had a much more ‘democratic’ state system, 9 having the Hansa cities as its 
reference for state organisation. In short, he concludes that (in negotiation) the 
Russians have a ‘winners-take-all’ mentality aiming at dominating or destroying their 
opponent.10  
 
In September 2009, twenty-six young Russian civil servants from across-the-board 
Russian Ministries and Agencies came to the College of Europe in the context of its 
collaboration with MGIMO, the Moscow State Institute of International Relations in 
Moscow. Under the guidance of the editor of this EU Diplomacy Paper the group 
simulated negotiations of the new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) 
between Russia and the EU. Or, as they formulated it in their final document 
“between the European Communities and their member states, of one part, and the 
Russian Federation, of the other part”. I thought ‘the EU’ would be adequate, but the 
Russian participants rightly said that the Lisbon Treaty had not been fully ratified yet. 
A dispute then followed between de facto and de jure perceptions, the pragmatism 
                                                 
6 Ibid., pp. 25-34. 
7 Jerrold. L. Schecter, Russian Negotiation Behavior, Washington, D.C., United States Institute 
of Peace, 1998. 
8 Ibid., p. 18. 
9 Ibid., p. 19. 
10 Ibid., p. 115. 
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of a Western European (Dutch) versus a more legalistic approach by the Russian 
participants. They negotiated a substantial and realistic agreement, not having any 
problem in representing both sides very empathically and insightfully. The EU should 
rejoice in their capability to understand the EU side so well and to be ready to fight 
for EU interests without taking into account their own cultural background. In that 
sense, the behaviour of the new generation of Russian civil servants comes close to 
that of the young diplomats of the European Union – according to my experience in 
training them in the context of the European Diplomatic Programme. This might 
mean more fruitful interaction and maybe give-and-take between the two sides, at 
least in the near future. 
 
The Russian group were good sports and they were ready to do the self-assessment 
exercise connected to the Thomas and Kilmann model. 11  They distinguish 
Competition, Collaboration, Compromise, Avoidance and Cooperation as modes of 
conflict management, or in other words: as negotiation strategies. The outcome of 
this exercise – group averages on the basis of individual male and female scores – 
confirmed the main feature of Russian negotiation style: a combative style. Though 
Compromise was the highest score – this is the case with any group as it is a kind of 
non-choice outcome – Competition/Domination scored second. This is very unusual; 
in general young male EU diplomats have Avoidance as their next highest score, 
while with females it is Accommodation. While the group scored highly on dominant 
behaviour, the Russian women scored even higher than the men (7.4 against 6.8 on 
a scale of 10). The lowest scores were for Collaboration (4.3) and Accommodation 
(4.5). The women scored even weaker (4.1 and 4.2) on these dimensions than the 
men (4.4 and 4.8 respectively). Avoidance scored middle of the road (5). To wrap-up: 
the group scored high on assertive and uncooperative behaviour. On the basis of 
the results of the conflict-mode exercise, combined with my observations of the PCA 
simulation exercise, the conclusion would be that – like in the past – the European 
Union will still be confronted with stiff negotiation behaviour of Russian negotiators as 
far as content is concerned, but their behaviour might be more flexible and 
empathic. This could be the fruit of the changes in Russian society in the late 
twentieth century, no overall inflexibility anymore, distributive on interests, integrative 
on process.     
 
Lessons to Be Learnt by the European Union?  
Though the Russian bargaining style does have a cultural, political and historical basis, 
context remains the dominating factor. Like any negotiation style, the Russian one is 
contextual indeed. Where the Russians are in a dependent position, they will be 
                                                 
11 Kenneth W. Thomas and Ralph H. Kilmann, Thomas-Kilmann Conflict Mode Survey, Tuxedo, 
Xicom, 1974. 
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more accommodative, whereas in an independent position, they will be competitive. 
They may try to avoid those issues that cannot be dealt with immediately and 
threaten the security of the state (see Yeltsin’s initial and follow-up strategies on 
Chechnya). Compromise will only be made if any other strategy cannot be effective. 
Collaboration, the final and most positive of Thomas and Kilmann’s five strategy 
models will only be doable if the European Union and the Russian Federation 
become more entangled than they are today.12  
 
Collaboration, or a win/win integrative relationship, is probably the EU’s preferred 
outcome of a new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the Russians. 
However, this point can only be reached if the EU approaches Russia, and Russia 
approaches the EU, packaging the main interdependencies on a broad front. But as 
Russia’s historic strategy seems to be as autarchic as possible – given traumas from 
the past – the negotiation road ahead will be bumpy at least. For the EU it is 
therefore advisable to take a competitive stance at the start of these negotiations 
and work its way towards collaborative behaviour, though compromise will probably 
be the final outcome. In any case, Russia will have to be more of a priority in EU 
policy-making than before, and avoidance cannot possibly be the answer. This is 
neither in the interest of the EU, nor of Russia – even, I dare to say, if this is not to the 
l i k i n g  o f  s o m e  f o r m e r  S o v i e t  ‘ a l l i e s ’  w h o  h a v e  s i n c e  b e c o m e  E U  m e m b e r  s t a t e s .  
Accommodation is not the answer either, as the Russians will see this as weakness 
and they will therefore disrespect the European Union. To be respected by the 
Russians is, given their experiences in the past, an absolute precondition for fruitful 
negotiations in the future. One might hope that these negotiation processes will, in 
the end, socialise Russia into ‘European’ negotiation culture: integrative instead of 
distributive bargaining. But even if stonewalling does continue, “this does not 
necessarily mean that the […] response […] should be to adopt the same tactics”. 13 
But it is important for EU negotiators to show strength at the same time as 
“negotiators who are perceived as confused, weak, vacillating, or uncertain will be 
both exploited and scorned”. 14    
 
About this Paper 
This EU Diplomacy Paper focuses on Russian negotiation style as a determinant in EU-
Russian relations. The paper tries to shed some light on the impact of Russian 
negotiation style on its dealings with the European Union by looking at five cases, 
written by students of the College of Europe’s EU International Relations and 
                                                 
12 Thomas and Kilmann, op.cit. 
13 Raymond F. Smith, Negotiating with the Soviets, Indianapolis, Indiana University Press, 1989, 
p. 119. 
14 Ibid. 
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Diplomacy Studies programme, Marcus Aurelius Promotion 2008-2009. Two cases 
deal with negotiations between the Russian Federation and the European Union. Two 
other cases use negotiations on energy to highlight Russian strategies and tactics, 
while one uses the example of Transnistria. This sample of cases thus provides 
examples of inner-public sector bargaining, the public sector-private sector 
dimension of international negotiation processes as well as inter-public-sector 
negotiations concerning a third party problem.  
 
I.   Adam Harrison, ‘Solving the Kaliningrad-Russia Transit Conundrum’ 
II.   Iana Stantieru, ‘Kremlin Tactics in the Transnistrian Conflict’ 
III.  Elmar Hellendoorn, ‘Shell and Sakhalin-II: Negotiations Russian Style’ 
IV.    Chloe Middleton, ‘The Interaction of Political and Economic Objectives in the 
E.ON-Gazprom Asset-Swap Negotiations, 2004-2008’ 
V.  Anna Panczocha, ‘Negotiating a New EU-Russia Agreement: A Three-level Game’ 
 
The first contribution to this paper, concerning Kaliningrad, seems to show us a much 
more lenient Russian behaviour, out of line with the ‘regular’ competitive style of 
Russian negotiators. My explanation would be that even the Russians will follow a 
more accommodative line if they have a clear power problem, as the Federation 
did under Yeltsin because of its internal chaos. This might be the case again – 
momentarily – if the economic crisis hits Russia hard. 
 
In the second contribution we find several examples of stonewalling tactics in the 
Transnistrian conflict: delay settlements if needed, apply sanctions if possible – a 
recent example being the Russian dealings with Ukraine – and combining those with 
incentives. Another tactic is using precedents – in this case Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia – as a means of broadening the negotiation into other issue areas. Third, the 
Sakhalin case adds tactics like ‘salami’ or bit-by-bit bargaining, escalation, drawing 
in side issues like the environment in order to threaten the other party, but also points 
to the effect of underestimating the Russians by Shell. Fourth, the E.ON/Gazprom 
study does not only refer to ‘salami tactics’ again, but also deals with BATNA (‘best 
alternative to a negotiated agreement’) issues: what are the available alternatives 
and to which extent do they influence the power balance in the negotiation? The 
last contribution, dealing with questions like the ‘zone of possible agreement’ (ZOPA), 
adds interesting comments on the individual EU member states’ reactions to the 
Russian moves, from fellow-travellers to iron-clad opponents.   
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Introduction: the Kaliningrad Conundrum 
By September 2002, with enlargement just around the corner, the EU and Russia sat 
down to negotiate on the issue of transit of people between Kaliningrad oblast 
(administrative region) and Russia ‘proper’.15 On the table were a variety of solutions 
designed to resolve the singular matter of freedom of movement between the soon-
to-be Baltic Sea exclave and Russia. One such solution was to install a high-speed 
train line across Lithuania. At talks in Brussels in 2002, Moscow’s Special 
Representative on the Kaliningrad problem, Dmitry Rogozin, unhappy with the rail 
speed that the EU deemed necessary, declared that the proposed 60-70 kilometres 
per hour would be more than enough to prevent migrants leaping from the moving 
train. Only three people, he said, would be able to manage this: James Bond, 
Batman and the Terminator.16 
 
This essay examines how the EU and Russia managed to move beyond discussion of 
train speeds and superhero rhetoric to reach a negotiated solution to the matter of 
Kaliningrad-Russia transit. It locates these negotiations within the broader web of 
issues and themes that affected their course and outcome. Using Zartman and 
Berman’s three-part model problem for solving bilateral negotiations,17 the Kalinin-
grad negotiations can be examined by looking at how the parties diagnosed the 
issue to resolve, defined a formula for resolution, and decided details of the 
agreement itself. The essay finds that the transit issue – a rather legalistic and 
technical matter – was not resolved using solely legal and technical means. Political 
concessions and compromise remained tools used by both the EU and Russia in 
pursuit of good relations, but also in the interests of winning broader assurances on 
migration – a promise of future visa-free travel for Moscow, and a readmission 
agreement for Brussels. Kaliningrad-specific matters such as socioeconomic develop-
ment and cross-border trade were largely swallowed up in broader migration and 
security issues. 
 
                                                 
15 When talking about the Russian ‘mainland’, to avoid a preponderance of quotation marks, 
and the awkward phrases ‘Russia proper’, and ‘big Russia’ (as is often used in the English-
language literature) the paper will henceforth refer to ‘Russia’, with an understanding that 
Kaliningrad is, of course, part of the Russian Federation.   
16   ‘Kasyanov against Kaliningrad Visas’, BBC, 27.09.02, retrieved 23.11.08, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/russian/news/newsid_2284000/2284756.stm. 
17 I. William Zartman and Maureen R. Berman, The Practical Negotiator, New Haven, Yale 
University Press, 1982, p. 93. 
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Pre-negotiation: Working out the Question 
 
With the prospect of EU enlargement, it was clear that an answer would be needed 
to the ‘Kaliningrad question’. But what exactly was the question? In fact, what posed 
itself to the EU and Russia was always more of a collection of questions, inter-related 
matters of a practical and technical nature, but which were far-reaching in their 
implications for the EU-Russia relationship. This was the first major occasion on which 
the EU and Russia were obliged to negotiate extensively on legal-technical matters 
which were not mostly economic in nature. The three key themes which concern 
Kaliningrad are: socio-economic development of the oblast, the construction of an 
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) in the EU, and the principle of the 
freedom of movement of persons in the Schengen area and in the Russian 
Federation. All three could have formed part of the final negotiated package to the 
Kaliningrad question. However, it was freedom of movement and security matters 




Kaliningrad has long been known to suffer from a number of problems, including an 
“exceptionally high level of prostitution, drug trafficking, AIDS and organised crime” 
in the oblast.18 The European Union had long been a donor to Kaliningrad, but the EU 
did not have a concerted strategy towards the region within the framework of EU-
Russia ties. Despite enlargement looming, there was no ‘pre-accession’ programme 
for Kaliningrad, and the EU-Russia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement itself 
focused only on EU-Russia relations, without mentioning any specific regions, even 
Kaliningrad, 19  although a ‘Special Programme for the Kaliningrad Oblast’ was 
developed post-enlargement.20 
 
There had previously been signs that Moscow recognised the need to help the 
oblast escape the socio-economic doldrums it drifted in. Testament to this are the 
capital’s plans for Kaliningrad as a ‘pilot project’ for cooperation with the EU in its 
                                                 
18  Igor Leshukov, ‘The Regional-Centre Divide: The Compatibility Conundrum’, in James 
Baxendale, Stephen Dewar and David Gowan (eds.), The EU & Kaliningrad: Kaliningrad and 
the Impact of EU Enlargement, London, Federal Trust for Education and Research, 2000, p. 
137. 
19 Stephen Dewar, ‘What Is to Be Done?’, in Baxendale, Dewar and Gowan (eds.), op.cit., p. 
236. 
20   European Commission Delegation to Russia, ‘Kaliningrad’, retrieved 30.08.09, 
http://www.delrus.ec.europa.eu/en/p_575.htm. 
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‘Mid-term Russia-EU Strategy Paper’, 21 which not only recognised the need for 
development, but placed the region firmly within the context of EU relations. 
Unfortunately, such pilot cooperation never emerged. Commenting on the 
subsequent transit negotiations, one analyst remarked that “many offers of turning 
the region into a more prosperous zone through special trade privileges or assistance 
by the EU were stalled in Moscow, apparently for fear of fuelling separatist 
tendencies”.22 This is despite the fact that Kaliningrad separatism is and was “virtually 
non-existent”.23 But, with development low on Moscow’s agenda, and the transit 
question becoming ever more urgent, socio-economic reform did not form part of 
the formula of negotiations.  
 
Enlargement presented a challenge to the EU in the form of the contradiction in the 
Union’s professed desire for new neighbours to share in the benefits of enlargement 
by ensuring borders did not serve to exclude. In fact, the encirclement by Schengen 
posed two problems for Kaliningrad. First, the loss of small cross-border trade into 
Lithuania and Poland, on which much of the local economy depended. Second, 
actual transit of persons between Kaliningrad and the rest of Russia. As will become 
clear, the final negotiated arrangement made provisions for the latter, but not the 
former. This too marked a sidelining of local development issues in favour of the more 
big ticket gains of facilitated travel for Russian citizens in general. For the EU’s part it 
did little to live up to its desire to avoid new dividing lines, nor to reconcile the tension 
between its emerging concepts of ‘Freedom’ and ‘Security’, to which this article 
now turns. 
 
Security and Freedom of Movement of Persons 
The prospect of Kaliningrad acting as a ‘Trojan Horse’ for Russian citizens to enter the 
Schengen Area illegally was an evident concern, particularly since the EU continued 
to harbour concerns about Russia, and Kaliningrad in particular, as a source of 
criminality and potential immigration impacting on the ‘Security’ plank of the 
emergent AFSJ. Potemkina notes that the EU’s view of Russia as a “potentially 
unstable regional power”24 raised the prospect that the Union’s internal and external 
goals come into conflict with each other, in terms of finding a satisfactory solution 
                                                 
21 Olga Potemkina, ‘Ramifications of Enlargement for EU-Russia Relations and the Schengen 
Regime’, in Joanna Apap (ed.), Justice and Home Affairs in the EU, Cheltenham, Edward 
Elgar, 2004, p. 304. 
22 Holger Moroff, ‘EU Policies towards Russia: Secondary Integration by Association?’, in Katlijn 
Malfliet, Lien Verpoest and Evgeny Vinokurov (eds.), The CIS, the EU and Russia: the 
Challenges of Integration, Houndmills, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, p. 106. 
23 CEPS, ‘Kaliningrad’s Borders and Transit to Mainland Russia: Practicalities and Remaining 
Bottlenecks’, CEPS, 19 February 2007, retrieved 18.11.09, http://epin.org/Article.php? 
article_id=264. 
24 Potemkina, op.cit., p. 300. 
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with Russia but also maintaining the integrity of the AFSJ. Meanwhile, the ‘Freedom’ 
plank of the AFSJ aimed for freedom of movement of persons across the Schengen 
space. At the same time, however, the Russian Federation’s Constitution guaranteed 
freedom of movement to its citizens across the federal territory. Another conflict 
therefore emerges: that the Schengen visa requirements would require Russian 
citizens to obtain visas from a foreign authority to travel within their own country. The 
need to find a workable solution for freedom of movement of Russian citizens sat 
uncomfortably with the EU’s heavily securitised discourse of ‘illegal immigration’ (the 
only major international organisation to do so) and its transfer of control of the 
movement of persons to its external frontier. The impending negotiations therefore 
shone the spotlight on a number of issues that were tricky and still in a state of 
development themselves within the EU. 
 
Getting to the Table 
Although three issue areas – development, security and freedom of movement of 
persons – impinged upon the EU-Russia relationship, these did not neatly resolve 
themselves into a single negotiating package. A clear diagnosis of what should be 
discussed emerged only gradually. At a 1998 Ministerial meeting between the EU 
and Eastern candidate countries it was made clear that full implementation of the 
Schengen provisions was envisaged for all candidates. This would naturally impact 
on Kaliningrad, but there had still been no official move to discuss the region in 
depth. 
 
At the EU Troika-Russia meeting in June 1999 Russia finally proposed that discussions 
take place regarding Kaliningrad within the framework of the PCA, a move which 
apparently took the Union by surprise.25 It does not appear that the various matters 
swirling around the Kaliningrad question prompted the EU to form a coherent 
position on what issues to discuss. The Commission “did not yet recognise the need to 
make special arrangements for the movement of people in and out of the 
Kaliningrad Region”,26 which was clear from the Commission’s Communication on 
‘The EU and Kaliningrad’ as late as 2001.27 Third-party commentators at that stage 
felt it clear that the question of transit would be central, and also “the most likely to 
create tensions”.28 Russia, too, had already devised a policy position, opting in 2001 
for “facilitated cross-border regime […] so that people could maintain their 
                                                 
25 René Nyberg, ‘The Baltic as an Interface between the EU and Russia’, in Baxendale, Dewar 
and Gowan (eds.), op.cit. 
26 CEPS, op.cit. 
27 European Commission, ‘The EU and Kaliningrad’, Communication from the Commission to 
the Council, COM(2001) 0026 final, Brussels, 18 January 2001. 
28 Nyberg, op.cit., p. 55. 
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economic and social contacts”. 29  Moreover, the role of then accession state 
Lithuania deserves mention as crucial third party to the talks. Nyberg believes that 
Lithuania played a key role in persuading Russia to discuss Kaliningrad. Indeed, as an 
immediate neighbour Lithuania had a crucial interest in the oblast, both in ensuring 
the matter of freedom of movement did not interfere with its EU accession or 
eventual entry into the Schengen zone, and as a country interested in the economic 
welfare of its near neighbour.30 It might also be added here that the Kaliningrad 
authorities do not appear to have played a key role in the transit negotiations, the 
lead negotiator coming from Moscow. 
 
Political versus Legal Solutions 
One apparent tension that would mark the progress of talks was that between the 
exigencies of the law on the one hand, and the scope for political compromise on 
the other. In its 2001 Communication, the Commission made clear its insistence on full 
implementation of the acquis without exception. However, at the EU-Russia summit in 
Moscow in May 2002 it became clear that the Russians would insist on actually 
retaining visa-free travel to the exclave. Former Foreign Minister Kozyrev stated that 
“[w]hat the president has said is that not only will we keep Kaliningrad, but we will 
continue to go there freely”.31 Russia thereby abandoned the policy it had held in 
2001 for a “facilitated cross-border regime”.32 The Russian shift meant that transit was 
still at the heart of the matter, but that Moscow had widened the package by 
proposing privileged rights for Kaliningraders to travel freely through future EU and 
Schengen territory which, given other concerns about the construction of an AFSJ, 
the EU was highly unlikely to concede on. The two sides thus moved further apart. 
 
Reviewing the situation, Makarychev argues that “the Russian government insisted 
on a predominantly political – as opposed to technical – solution, presuming that the 
EU should make a number of exceptions from the existing rules regulating border-
crossing procedures”.33 This is further evident in a 2001 Russian document which 
envisaged that for Community policies on visas and on external borders “we rather 
need the principal political decision, while technicalities may be settled later on”.34 
Some, including several Russian analysts, doubted whether Moscow understood the 
legalistic nature of the matter at hand: “the problem is that up to the present time 
                                                 
29 Potemkina, op.cit., p. 307. 
30 Lithuania has been a consistent advocate of facilitating a small border traffic regime for 
Kaliningraders, and helped broker the eventual 2003 transit agreement.   
31 John Daniszewski, ‘Putin Balks at Visa Plan for Kaliningrad’, LA Times, 30 May 2002, retrieved 
18.11.09, http://8.12.42.31/2002/may/30/world/fg-russia30. 
32 Potemkina, op.cit., p. 307. 
33 Andrey S. Makarychev, ‘EU-Russian Intersubjective (Dis)connections’, in Michael Emerson 
(ed.), The Elephant and the Bear Try Again, Brussels, CEPS, 2006, p. 29. 
34 Quoted in Potemkina, op.cit., pp. 306-307. 
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there are few politicians in Russia who know what the Schengen acquis is”. 35 
Whether true or not, by 2002 negotiations had become highly politicised. President 
Putin declared at the Moscow summit that with regard to the Kaliningrad transit "[i]t is 
no exaggeration to say that our overall relations with the European Union depend on 
how this issue, of vital importance to Russians, is resolved". 36 In the meantime 
Lithuania and Poland had begun to tighten up on requirements for entry in 
preparation for EU accession, which no doubt sharpened Moscow’s attention on the 
issue. Kaliningrad residents were due to lose the right to enter Lithuanian territory visa-
free from the start of 2003. Bearing in mind the differing political and technical 
approaches, at that summit the EU did attempt to create a workable political 
package by placing recognition of Russia as a market economy on the table.37 This 
was unsuccessful, and the rift between the two sides remained. Commissioner Patten 
declared in a face-to-face meeting with the Russian Prime Minister and Foreign 
Minister that the EU was not going to “override its basic rules here, including 
Schengen, nor undermine the enlargement negotiations themselves”.38  
 
Russian Prime Minister Kasyanov continued to push hard publicly for an entirely visa-
free regime for Kaliningrad residents. Nevertheless, as Jönsson remarks, one 
“common understanding of negotiations is that the parties initially ask for more than 
they expect to get”.39 It may appear that the EU, in sticking to a purely legalistic 
approach, had not followed this standard procedure. However, it soon brought to 
the table other issues related to migration and the AFSJ. The Union managed to 
persuade Russia to look into concluding a readmission agreement. This had been 
one of the “unresolved issues in EU-Russia relations for some time”,40 and was a link 
made by the EU to a central concern of AFSJ construction. One analyst believes that 
the issuing of the ‘Facilitated Transit Document’ (FTD – the eventual cornerstone of 
the transit agreement), “was dependent on the results of the talks on readmission”.41 
Indeed, this was unusual, since readmission agreements had previously been signed 
only by partner countries receiving visa-free provisions in return. Consequently, in a 
reciprocal bid, Russia proposed it join the EU’s ‘visa-free list’, a somewhat surprising 
development. In 2001 the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) had designated 
Russia as the country most unlikely to receive visa-free status out of all eastern 
                                                 
35 Ibid., p. 301. 
36 Quoted in Daniszewski, op.cit. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Quoted in Potemkina, op.cit., p. 308. 
39 Christer Jönsson, ‘Conceptualizations of the Negotiation Process’, Paper prepared for the 
4th Pan-European International Relations Conference, Canterbury, 8-10 September 2001, in 
Paul Meerts (ed.), Workbook on International Negotiation, The Hague, Clingendael, 2008, p. 
81. 
40 Potemkina, op.cit., p. 308. 
41 Ibid., p. 315. 
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European countries, 42  but the prospect for which found its way into the final 
negotiated agreement. 
 
In the second half of 2002 these issues began to be hammered out in a package 
which had now gone beyond a mere transit agreement. Furthermore, over 
negotiations in the latter half of that year hung the threat communicated from 
Moscow that the scheduled November EU-Russia talks would be boycotted by 
President Putin in the absence of an agreement.43 Incidentally, the EU accepted in 
principle the idea of a Schengen-compliant fast rail link, but said that its feasibility 
could only be assessed after Lithuania’s accession to the EU. 44  In fact, the 
compromise reached at the November 2002 meeting gave grounds to observers to 
remark that the “EU uses ‘technical’ and ‘political’ approaches selectively, and 
Russia may do either too.”45 The Commission’s September Communication, whose 
provisions were adopted at the imminent summit, had already made a step-change 
from the previous year in recognising that the “impact on the population [of 
Kaliningrad] may be greater […] than in other parts of Russia”.46 It put forward a 
number of suggestions, including the development of a Facilitated Transit Document, 
which was to be “deemed equivalent to a multiple-entry transit visa”.47  
 
Thus, a formula was found which satisfied both the EU and Russia, but also Lithuania 
which, as a candidate country, participated in the talks. It supported the EU in its 
insistence on maintaining the integrity of future Schengen implementation,48 but 
eventually also agreed to the EU’s FTD compromise, satisfied that this would not 
relegate the country to a “third- or second-tier member”.49 Finally, agreement was 
formally reached when the EU and Russia signed the ‘Joint Statement on Transit 
between the Kaliningrad Region and the Rest of the Russian Federation’ in 
November 2002. Negotiations on the details of the agreement continued on into the 
spring of 2003, though with the larger political issues agreed upon, the discussion 
                                                 
42 Joanna Apap, ‘Friendly Schengen Borderland Policy on the New Borders of an Enlarged EU 
and its Neighbours’, Brussels, CEPS, Policy Brief, no. 7, 2001, p. 12. 
43   ‘Several EU Countries to Reject Commission Proposal on Kaliningrad’, Euractiv, 27 
September 2002, retrieved 23.11.08, http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/eu-countries-
reject-commission-proposal-kaliningrad/article-111059.   
44 This option was later rejected for lack of compliance with the Schengen regime, ahead of 
a 2004 report demonstrating the scheme’s lack of cost-effectiveness. See: Gerhard Lohan, 
‘Kaliningrad Transit: Achievements and Perspectives’, Kaliningrad Expert, 6 September 2006, 
retrieved 23.11.08, http://kaliningradexpert.org/node/2980. 
45 Makarychev, op.cit., p30. 
46  European Commission, ‘Kaliningrad Transit’, Communication of the Commission to the 
Council, COM(2002) 510 final, Brussels, 18 September 2002, p. 6. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Potemkina, op.cit., p. 308. 
49 BBC, op.cit. 
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concentrated on who would foot the bill of the issuance of FTDs on the Lithuanian 
side; the EU eventually agreed to fund the full costs.50 
 
Assessment 
It did not go unnoticed by onlookers that the FTD bore a close resemblance to the 
old visa; President Lukashenko of Belarus weighed in on the debate with a swipe at 
Russia: “A visa was pink, and now it will be blue and a bit cheaper – what success is 
Russia speaking about?”51 Nevertheless, the deal permitted the EU to uphold the 
principles of the acquis, reassured Lithuania that its position regarding enlargement 
would not be undermined, and provided Russia with a de facto, rather than a de 
jure, visa, which would allow the government to claim a victory back home. 
 
One essential and much-criticised weakness of the package, however, was that it 
left open-ended the future of the agreement in the light of anticipated expansion of 
the Schengen area to encompass Lithuania. Although other issues, such as a fully 
visa-free regime for all Russians at an unspecified point in the future, were brought 
into play at the negotiations in order to reach a compromise, other matters were put 
to one side, but have reared their head again in current EU-Russia relations. For 
example, the matter of small border traffic in the context of the Schengen visa 
regime, for which Russia and Lithuania currently would both like to introduce 
provisions, was not tackled. The extent of this small tolerance zone into both EU and 
Kaliningrad territory remains disputed. Meanwhile, the FTD operates to this day, but 
the somewhat exceptional nature of this measure within the Schengen zone has not 
gone unnoticed by Russian negotiators who are attempting to win free Schengen 
visas for Kaliningrad residents, making open reference to the exception that the FTD 
appears to constitute in order to bolster their case.52  
 
Much has been made of the Russians’ desire for a ‘political’ solution and the 
resultant clash with the EU’s ‘legal-technical’ position. However, the division was 
never as clear-cut as this, as evidenced by the outcome and concessions made by 
both sides. The EU maintained the integrity of the freedom and security elements of 
the Schengen system by finding a legally and politically acceptable compromise, 
and Russia had a valid cause in defending the freedom of movement of persons on 
its own territory. Politically, it could not succeed in achieving exceptions from the EU 
on transit, nor for winning visa-free travel outright, though the inclusion of this 
demand broadened the negotiating zone considerably, giving it greater leeway for 
                                                 
50   ‘Kaliningrad’s Borders and Transit to Mainland Russia: Practicalities and Remaining 
Bottlenecks’, op.cit. 
51 Izvestiia, in Potemkina, op.cit., p. 315. 
52   ‘MID Authorised to Make an Offer’, Vremya, 24 October 2008, retrieved 23.11.08, 
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later compromise. The negotiations should also be understood as the prelude to a 
more long-term, evolving relationship between the EU and Russia encompassing 
questions of the relationship between territory, freedom of movement and migration. 
Other issues were left unresolved by the 2003 deal and left to fester, while matters of 
economic and social reform for the oblast were sidelined. These will not disappear. 
 
Kaliningrad recently hit the international headlines again thanks to Russia’s proposed 
deployment of Iskander missiles there. From Russia’s perspective this is part of a much 
broader interplay between Russia, the US and NATO. With the US more tightly 
involved and keen on a resolution of the matter, and with discussion on a ‘new 
security architecture for Europe’, dealings around this patch of land on the Baltic 
may yet grow more intricate. From the EU’s point of view, the migration and crime 
challenges from Kaliningrad remain issues more firmly within its competence. 
Referring to the original round of negotiations on Kaliningrad transit, Finnish Prime 
Minister Paavo Lipponen had concluded that the Kaliningrad question would be 
solvable “if it doesn’t get linked in with larger complex of problems”.53 In fact, the 
2003 agreement was reached by moving away from a purely technical approach, 
and was reached by issue linkage to related areas. The Kaliningrad question 
indeed – perhaps inevitably – grew beyond the question of mere transit. The region 
became the scene of a host of internal security concerns and external security 
challenges thanks to the sad state of Kaliningrad itself and its usefulness to Moscow 
on a broader scale. Its Trojan Horse-like nature within the EU’s Troy may yet facilitate 
further issue linkage, whether involving the aforementioned issues that remain 
unresolved, or broader issues of bilateral or multilateral concern.   
 
                                                 
53 BBC, op.cit. 
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The Transnistrian conflict, between the Republic of Moldova and its breakaway 
region on the left bank of the Dniester River, has already been analysed from many 
perspectives; this contribution focuses on how Moscow is using tactical instruments in 
dealing with this issue. Since one third of the population in this region is Russian, one 
third Ukrainian and one third Moldovan, Moscow tries to control this region directly 
and indirectly, using diverse strategies and tools. This essay aims at analyzing various 
coercive measures or tools used by Russia in this conflict and the consequences of 
these instruments on Moldova’s economy, social life and political situation. For this 
purpose, I employ as a theoretical approach the use of tactical instruments in 
international negotiations, in this case, the negotiations on the Transnistrian conflict. 
 
The first part is dedicated to a short analysis of the conflict and the implications it has 
on the parties involved, with a special focus on the real parties involved in this 
dispute. Secondly, the paper discusses the use of tactical instruments in negotiation 
processes. The third part embarks on an investigation of how these tactical 
instruments are used by Russia in the case of Moldova and implicitly in the 
Transnistrian region. Finally, the paper foresees a possible scenario which would 
contribute to the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict and would avoid further 
pressure on Moldova.  
 
Understanding the Reality of the Transnistrian Conflict 
The nature of the Transnistrian conflict can be understood as many other post-Soviet 
conflicts. Therefore, the focus has to be on the complexity of the game played by 
the actors involved in this scenario. The Transnistrian region, consisting of several 
districts on the left side of the Dniester River, in the past was an integrated part of 
Moldova. Since this area is of crucial geo-strategic importance, it was often traded 
between the winners of wars and used as a pawn in negotiation processes. Hence, 
the Transnistrian conflict must be considered a strategic theatre through which the 
Russians want to maintain their control in the region as well as blocking the extension 
and consolidation of the EU and NATO in this area. The case of Transnistria is usually 
referred to as a ‘frozen conflict’. The term is still appropriate since the conflict remains 
unsolved and the talks and negotiations on this issue have not progressed 
significantly. From another angle, considering the consolidation of the regime 
installed in the region of the left side of the river, the conflict does not seem to be 
that ‘frozen’.  
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Most scholars consider the conflict as taking place between the Moldovan side and 
the Transnistrian leaders of the Russia-backed breakaway strip of Moldova. However, 
about 99% of the leaders conducting politics and business in Transnistria are Russian 
nationals. Even the so-called ‘president’ of the ‘Pridnestrovskaia Moldavskaia 
Respublica’ (Prednestrovian Moldovan Republic) Igor Smirnov, entered Transnistrian 
territory for the first time in 1986. The other leaders came or were sent by the Kremlin 
to Transnistria even later and now they are ruling this region. Moreover, there is not a 
direct dispute between the Moldovan and the Transnistrian population, given the 
fact that they have the same ethnic, religious, linguistic and cultural composition.  
 
Since Transnistria has strong political and economic support from Russia and all the 
laws implemented in Transnistria are made by the Kremlin, this regime can be called 
an occupational regime. When Moldova declared its independence, the Russians 
had encouraged the Transnistrian population and its leaders to view this as a 
violation of their language rights and the perspective of unification with Romania. 
Consequently, the conflict was manoeuvred by Moscow from the beginning until 
now which implies that the conflict is principally one between Moldova and Russia. 
However, the Russian administration ‘puts the blame’ only on the Transnistrian 
separatists who want to gain their independence from the Moldovan authorities. The 
only time Russia has recognised that it is the one involved in this conflict and not 
Transnistria, was when the cease-fire agreement was signed in July 1992 between the 
Moldovan president Mircea Snegur and his Russian counterpart Boris Yeltsin. 
Analyzing all these reasons we can conclude that “Transnistria is not part of the 
conflict”54 and the conflict is mainly between the Republic of Moldova and its ‘elder 
brother’, the Russian Federation. For that reason, the negotiations55 in the case of the 
Transnistrian conflict are to take place between the Moldovan side and the Russian 
side.  
 
The Concept of Tactical Instruments in International Negotiations  
In the context of international negotiations, “sovereign partners meet to find a joint 
and mutually acceptable solution to a dispute”.56 I n  o r d e r  t o  g a i n  a s  m u c h  a s  
possible, the negotiators or the parties involved use different tactics, in particular 
                                                 
54 Nantoi Oazu, ‘Cazul Republicii Moldova: ce ar putea face UE şi SUA?’, Chisinau, Institute for 
Public Politics, 2005, p. 1, retrieved 29.11.08, http://www.ipp.md/public/comentarii/39/ro/ 
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56 Victor Kremenyuk, ‘The Emerging System of International Negotiation’, in Victor Kremenyuk 
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A Wiley Company, 2002, 2nd edition, p. 23. 
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when one or both parties are not willing to give priority to a compromising solution. 
Raymond Saner points out that “a number of tactics are however much less suited to 
the cooperative approach than to a confrontation”.57 
 
The tactics used in international negotiations depend on several factors such as the 
negotiator’s experience and self-confidence, the political and economic power of a 
country on the international stage and the extent to which it can afford to use 
extreme tactics, or how far the negotiators can go in reaching a compromise. The 
main tactics mentioned by Saner are: agenda control, time constraints, delaying 
tactics, adjournment, taking a short break, location of the talks, limits of authority, 
precedent, regulations and standards, threats, promises, false compromises, flattery 
and charm, interpreters, impasse and deadlock, secrecy, etc.58 Additionally, other 
t a c t i c s  h a v e  t o  b e  m e n t i o n e d ,  s u c h  a s  e c o n o m i c  a n d  p o l i t i c a l  p r e s s u r e  o r  
manipulation, and economic incentives and sanctions have a crucial role in “the 
conduct of international affairs”59 and implicitly in international negotiations. In the 
following, I will focus on those tactical instruments relevant to the case study.  
 
One of the most known and used instruments in international negotiations is a 
delaying tactic; one party prolongs the negotiations in order to gain more or to 
come to a favourable point in order to conclude the negotiations. This tactics is 
especially used by the party which “prefers the status quo” and therefore that party 
“has absolutely no interest in negotiating”.60 If the status quo is convenient for both 
parties, it is even more improbable that a solution will be reached. This tactic is very 
relevant for our case and it is used by negotiators as they evoke a precedent. Even if 
some cases have many differences in the context, actors involved or timing, 
negotiators use this tactic of precedent if this precedent case “suits them”61 and 
their interest. In exceptional cases, the parties can use threats such as terrorism, 
military attacks, violence and even war. In a ‘lighter’ sense, the threats can serve “as 
a tactical confrontational tool, an instrument of a strategy that uses pressure and 
exhortation”.62  
 
As far as the economic measures are concerned, we can include here as further 
tactical instruments the economic sanctions used (and the lack of economic 
                                                 
57 Raymond Saner, The Expert Negotiator, Leiden/Boston, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008, 3rd 
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58 Ibid., pp. 137-152.  
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incentives). In other words, the tactic employed features many ‘sticks’ but offers few 
‘carrots’. In the case of economic sanctions “pressure is generated for smuggling 
and the circumvention of trade restrictions”.63 These sanctions can take the form of 
embargoes, discriminatory tariffs or the cut-off of gas and oil supply. As far as 
‘carrots’ are concerned, we talk about incentives consisting of providing assistance 
and preferential agreements or offering long-term credits. 64 Most of the above 
tactical instruments have been used by the Kremlin towards the Moldovan side in the 
Transnistrian conflict.  
 
The Kremlin’s Successful Use of Tactical Instruments  
As far as Russian negotiators are concerned, they are willing to achieve their 
objectives “by one means or another including the use of threats, agitation, bribery, 
inducements, or any other number of things”.65 The easiest instrument to apply to the 
Transnistrian conflict is delaying its settlement – creating a ‘frozen conflict’. Delaying 
and maintaining the status quo is favourable for all parties involved. This way, Russia 
can maintain its political and geo-strategic control in the former Soviet space 
“because Moldova is still viewed by many in Moscow as a sphere of exclusively 
Russian geopolitical interest”.66 On the other hand, the Transnistrian leaders profit 
from the situation to pursue their economic and political goals. The delaying tactic 
has been used very successfully by Russians considering the fact that the conflict has 
been unsettled since 1991 and no concrete plan for conflict resolution is foreseen in 
the near future.  
 
A second tactical instrument used by Moscow is precedent, in our case the 
precedent of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. During the August 2008 meeting between 
the Russian President Dmitri Medvedev and his Moldovan counterpart Vladimir 
Voronin, the former subtly warned the Moldovan president that the Transnistrian 
conflict had to be seen in the context of the Georgian conflict. The Russian president 
suggested that the Transnistrian region shall follow the South Ossetian example. This 
would mean that the Moldovan government would take into consideration the draft 
law on the status of Transnistrian autonomy “which was voted through a political 
consensus on July 22, 2005” in a referendum 67 i n  w h i c h  m o r e  t h a n  9 0 %  o f  t h e  
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Transnistrian population opted for independence. This precedent tactic went even 
further: Abkhazian and South Ossetian representations opened in Tiraspol, while 
Transnistria opened its representations in Tzhinval and Sukhumi.  All these were 
possible thanks to “the consent of the ‘elder friend’, that means Moscow”.68  
 
Additionally, during the presidential meeting in August 2008, the Moldovan president 
was warned to rule out a potential Moldovan military intervention in the self-
proclaimed region of Transnistria. Another tactical instrument used by the Kremlin is 
military control over the region. As a concrete example, Russia has refused several 
times to respect the Istanbul commitments, 69 which foresaw the withdrawal of 
Russian troops from the Transnistrian territory, recognizing only the 1992 agreement 
which views the Russian troops as ‘peacekeeping forces’.  Russia additionally 
suspended its participation in the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty on 12 
December 2007,70 which would have required Russia to withdraw its “troops from 
breakaway regions in the former Soviet states of Georgia and Moldova”.71 
 
The most effective tactical instruments used by Moscow are economic sanctions 
which “are sometimes associated with general trade embargoes, […] the use of 
targeted and selective measures”. 72 Every time Moscow is not satisfied with a 
Moldovan decision regarding the withdrawal of the 14th Russian army, or other issues 
related to the Transnistrian dispute, it applies economic sanctions to Moldova. One 
of these sanctions was the wine embargo applied to Moldova in 2006. The Russian 
side justified its embargo by invoking the low quality of the Moldovan wine and the 
peril it represented to the Russian population’s health. Therefore, thousands of wine 
bottles of Moldovan wine were destroyed, while the Moldovan producers were not 
reimbursed. This health ‘danger’ conveniently arises only in those situations where 
Moscow finds domestic Moldovan political decisions unpalatable. Immediately after 
the export restrictions were imposed on Moldovan wine, new favourable treatment 
was applied to the Transnistrian wine by Russian authorities. These economic 
restrictions come also when the Moldovan government tries to impose stricter rules to 
the Transnistrian products in order to reduce the black market. The embargo was 
lifted once Moldovan-Russian relations became warmer and the issue related to the 
Russian 14th army was temporarily excluded from the agenda. This embargo cost 
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Moldova 21 billion US dollars, as the former prime minister Vasile Tarlev declared.73 It 
led to a destabilisation and deterioration of the Moldovan economy at least for a 
short period of time. The income from wine exports to Russia represents almost 4% of 
Moldova’s budget and such an embargo consequently has a considerable impact 
on the economy.74 A similar economic sanction imposed by Russia on Moldova was 
the gas cut-off in January 2006. Since around 90% of Moldova’s energy imports 
come from Russia, this sanction had significant repercussions on the economy and 
on the future security of supply.75 Therefore, Moldova had to reach “an agreement 
over gas prices with Russia, ending a spat that led to supplies being cut off”.76 
 
On the other hand, Transnistrian leaders benefited from various incentive instruments 
coming from Moscow. Firstly, the oil and gas prices are lower than those paid by 
other former Soviet republics. Secondly, in 2007 the Russian Federation has offered a 
financial aid consisting of 26 billion US dollars to the separatist region of Transnistria.77 
The aim of this donation was financial support to the Russian population living in 
Transnistria, since a large number of people have obtained Russian passports in 
recent years. Once the population from this region gets Russian citizenship, Moscow 
has an excuse for protecting its citizens when offering all kind of financial and 
political support to the Transnistrian separatists.  
 
Next Steps...  
The examples mentioned above illustrate that Russia has been very successful in 
using a variety of tactical instruments in the Transnistrian conflict. These range from 
political tactics such as reference to the precedent cases of South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia to financial tactics such as embargoes and economic incentives for the 
Transnistrian authorities. As we can see, “power is one of the most important 
determining factors”78 in negotiations for Russia, be it economic or political power. 
Moreover, Russians tend to “test the authority [of their counterpart and once] is not 
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firm and consistent, it will be first disregarded and then cast off”.79 Since Moldova has 
no economic self-sustainability, trade power or political influence on the international 
stage, the Kremlin could easily impose these negotiating tactics to Moldova’s 
disadvantage.  
 
In order to increase their political control and prevent the continued application of 
these unfair tactics in the future, the Moldovan authorities have to seek more 
Western support, especially coming from the European Union. In this perspective, the 
EU would have to increase its “involvement in diplomatic efforts to solve the 
Transnistrian conflict […] first by invitation and then later by its own initiatives”.80 The 
European Union has to have a more active role in the new negotiating formula ‘5+2’ 
(which is formed by the Republic of Moldova, the Russian Federation, Ukraine, the 
OSCE and the Transnistrian representatives, while the EU and the US are observers), 
beyond being a passive observer during the negotiations. The EU could even 
perform the role of a mediator which would lead to the settlement of the 
Transnistrian conflict, trying to find an acceptable solution for all the parties involved. 
Even though the EU is present in the region through its border mission EUBAM and 
through a Special Representative and the Commission delegation, its role and 
interest in solving the conflict seems rather limited. The EU would have enough 
instruments at its disposal such as high-level diplomacy, a more active role of its 
Special Representative or the use of shuttle diplomacy. However, since EU-Russia 
relations are already complicated enough such a scenario might have to be 
postponed for better times. The EU could use more of its ‘sticks’ and ‘carrots’ when 
negotiating with Russia on this issue, or even include this issue in the framework of 
other negotiation processes. For now, suffice is to say that without any external help 
or without Russia’s political will, the conflict will remain ‘frozen’. 
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Introduction: a Public-Private Game 
In late 2006 it became clear that Russia’s President Putin had set his eyes on 
obtaining the majority stake in the world’s and Russia’s largest gas project, Sakhalin-II. 
During the 1990s an oil consortium, led by Royal Dutch/Shell, was awarded the rights 
to develop this project, seemingly a very profitable and prestigious undertaking. But 
President Putin wanted to renegotiate the deal, get Gazprom to take charge of 
Sakhalin-II and give the control over its natural resources back to Russia. He 
succeeded and Shell seemed ‘humiliated’.81 
 
How did Russia negotiate with the Western energy giant and its Japanese partners so 
that Shell’s CEO, Van der Veer, in the end even thanked Putin for the ‘humiliating’ 
deal?82 Probably, the Russian success in negotiating was based upon a process of 
continuous escalation, whenever Shell and Western governments threatened or 
vowed to compromise. This contribution aims to provide better insight of this 
particular negotiation process, first through a short introduction to what is 
theoretically perceived as the Russian style of negotiation; and secondly, by 
providing a chronological overview of the Sakhalin-II negotiations, in order to better 
understand what happened. In the conclusion the Russian negotiation style will be 
held against the empirics. Since the negotiations were conducted in secret, and only 
public sources could be accessed for this research, the analysis depends on publicly 
known facts.  
  
The Russian Style of Negotiation 
F ir s t,  s o m e  a t te n t i o n  s h a l l  b e  p a i d  to  w h a t  h a s  b e e n  r e c o g n is e d  a s  f e a tu r e s  o f  a  
‘Russian negotiation style’. If not indicated otherwise, this characterisation will be 
based on Sloss and Davis’ work.83 The first point that is addressed is the humiliation 
that Russia suffered by being invaded many times during her history. Therefore, the 
Russians “consider the status of their lands […] presently under their control entirely 
beyond discussion […]. They have nothing to lose and always something to gain from 
negotiations”.84 The Russians begin their negotiations well-prepared and try to push 
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the other party to be the first to compromise, using the threat of force, agitation and 
(sometimes) inducements. They will normally start with an extreme position and hold 
to it stubbornly, trying to force the opponent to make the first proposal. Since 
compromise is seen a sign of weakness, the Russian negotiator will try to ‘pocket’ the 
opponent once the latter has made a first concession, and, without himself giving 
anything up, push vehemently for further concessions. However, because Russians 
like to be perceived as equal to the West, they will usually stick to their contractual 
obligations. Therefore, it is extremely important to try to pin the Russians down on 
details. It is interesting to see to what extent this description is reflected in the 
Sakhalin-II negotiations with Shell. 
 
Setting the Stage 
After the breakdown of the Soviet Union, Russia entered a period of instability and 
perceived weakness under President Yeltsin. Foreign companies and investors were 
needed to provide necessary capital for the development of the country’s 
abundant natural resources. In order to sweeten the deal for the foreign investors, so-
called ‘product sharing agreements’ were concluded. They implied that foreign 
companies only needed to pay taxes and royalties to the Russian state once the 
costs of starting their projects had been covered by the profits.85 This clearly offered 
a perspective for interesting deals. 
 
At the end of the 1990s Shell decided to start the Sakhalin-II project in a partnership 
with the Japanese corporations Mitsui and Mitsubishi. In early 2005, Shell held a 
controlling stake of 55% (initially investing 10 billion US dollars) in the Sakhalin Energy 
Investment Corporation (SEIC), with Mitsui and Mitsubishi holding 25% and 20% 
respectively. The latest and most sophisticated hydrocarbon exploitation 
technologies would be put to use in the difficult Siberian environment.86 It was the 
only project in Russia without Russian participation at the time.87 
 
Negotiations Begin 
In the course of 2005 Gazprom made it clear that it wanted to get a controlling 25% 
stake in SEIC and offered to swap half of its Sakhalin-II stocks with Shell for a 50% stake 
in another gas field in Western Siberia, the Zapolyarnoye field.88 In the beginning of 
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July 2005 both parties signed a memorandum of understanding in which they 
agreed on this exchange. However, it did not seem a fair deal for Shell, since it had 
to pay for 50% of the sunken development costs of the Zapolyarnoye field, but 
Gazprom would not pay anything for the 25% stake in the Sakhalin-II project.89 
Commentators suggested that Shell felt political pressure to accept this relatively 
disadvantageous deal.90 
 
However, Shell announced that the Sakhalin-II project proved to be more difficult 
than foreseen. Its development costs were to be increased by 67%, and Shell had to 
double its investments (officially) to 20 billion US dollars. For the Russian government 
this meant two things: firstly, since the Sakhalin project would also become more 
expensive for Gazprom, it wanted Shell to pay more for the Zapolyarnoye swap. This 
move could be perceived as a Shell bargaining trick;  they were already aware of 
the fact that Sakhalin would be more costly91 and perhaps sought a way to improve 
the initial Zapolyarnoye deal they had felt forced into by the Russian political 
pressure. Secondly, this meant that Shell told President Putin to wait just a bit longer 
for Sakhalin’s oil and gas revenues to flow to the Russian treasury, as concluded in 
the initial ‘production sharing agreement’ (PSA).92 
 
It seems that the Russian President liked neither being tricked by Shell nor being told 
by this Western corporation that he had to wait for his money. It is said that Putin was 
‘enraged’.93 Russia had offered the company a very advantageous PSA and now 
the state had to pay for Shell’s internal problems. The first reaction from the Russian 
government was to block Shell from participating in the exploration and exploitation 
of the Shtokman gas field in the Barents Sea.94 Afterwards, it tried to prevent Shell 
from making further investments required to proceed in Sakhalin. During a state visit 
to the Netherlands in November 2005, President Putin said that rising project costs 
would not be accepted. 95 In May 2006, the Russian Natural Resources Minister 
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backed a report from a Russian natural science institute that suggested “boosting 
the presence of Russian companies in [the Sakhalin Energy Investment Cooperation] 
to 51 per cent as one of the measures to boost efficiency”, thus making sure that 
royalties started flowing to the Russian state.96 One month later Shell was invited to 
participate in the construction of a gas liquefying factory, a project unrelated, or at 
least physically not connected, to the Sakhalin-II undertakings.97 These first steps by 
the Russians coincide with the characteristics expected by Sloss and Davis, since it 
was proposed that the Russian lands should be under Russian control. However, 
contrary to what Sloss and Davis predict, the Russian negotiators began rather ‘soft’, 
only to become more extreme during later phases of the negotiations. 
 
Endgame 
The opening shots of the final battle between Shell and the Russian state over 
Sakhalin-II were fired in the first week of August 2006. The Russian Natural Resources 
Ministry announced that it would stop the construction of pipelines by the Shell-led 
consortium because of environmental concerns. 98  A few weeks later, on 19 
September 2006, the Russian environmental agency ‘Rosprironadzor’ officially filed a 
complaint against the Shell-led consortium for violating environmental standards. 
Consequently, the operating permit for the consortium was withdrawn, effectively 
stopping all work at Sakhalin-II.99 
 
Immediately, the European Commission and the Japanese government stated their 
concerns regarding the Russian move. Energy Commissioner Piebalgs made clear 
that “a secure and predictable investment climate is necessary in Russia. […] This 
applies as much to the ability of EU companies to invest in Russia as to the right of 
Russian companies to sell gas and oil freely at both upstream and downstream levels 
in the EU.”100 In other words, Commissioner Piebalgs threatened that if Shell were not 
treated in a ‘fair way’, the imports of Russian gas to the EU would be lowered. This 
was a bold (in fact quite empty) statement because of the high dependence of the 
EU on Russian gas.101 
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In response, the Russian government told Shell that the initial contract and the PSA 
would be respected. The Russian Ambassador in The Hague confirmed that Russia’s 
contract with Shell would be honoured.102 The original statement made by President 
Putin, almost a year beforehand, was repeated by his Minister of Economic Affairs: “I 
have told Shell that we can't simply swallow this figure and that they need to come 
u p  w i t h  s o m e  k i n d  o f  s o l u t i o n ” . 103 Observers commented that Russia could not 
change the terms of the original contract, but that it is was creating conditions 
where Shell and its partners wanted to renegotiate “under the point of a gun”.104 The 
rising costs seemed thus to be a focal point of the Russian negotiation efforts 
because these costs forestalled payment of royalties to the Russian state. 
 
Further political pressure by some European heads of government did not appear to 
make any impact on the Kremlin. On 22 September 2006 the Dutch Prime Minister 
Balkenende phoned President Putin to voice his concern and agreed that the 
Sakhalin-II partner would work together with the Russian government to “find a 
solution”.105 Obviously, Prime Minister Balkenende had not been able to produce a 
less ambiguous outcome of his phone call with his Russian homologue. On 12 
October 2006, Russia gave Germany the role of ‘strategic partner’ for Gazprom’s gas 
deliveries.106 This was timed in an excellent way, dividing European interests at the 
European Council meeting in Finland on 20 October 2006, to which President Putin 
was also invited. British Prime Minister Blair asked Putin to treat European investors in 
Russia in the same way as Russian investors were treated in the EU. Putin, however, 
called Shell’s increased cost projection for Sakhalin “scandalous”107 and said that 
“he had no intention of bowing to European demands”.108 
 
Russia’s stance on Shell escalated during and after this political pressure. On 20 
October 2006 the Russian tax collectors’ office laid down a tax claim against the 
company.109 Furthermore, although Shell came forward with proof of its improve-
ments in the ecological situation in Sakhalin, on 26 October 2006 the Russian environ-
mental agency threatened the oil company with criminal charges for the environ-
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mental damage caused.110 As soon as Shell complied with the standards set by the 
regulators, the Russian side came up with new irregularities.111 Interestingly, on 22 
October 2006 a leaked internal Russian government report predicted that the costs 
for Sakhalin-II would rise to 28 billion US dollars, instead of the 20 billion US dollars 
officially projected by Shell.112 
 
When these Russian negotiation moves are held against the theory provided by Sloss 
and Davis, it is interesting to see that the Russians indeed respected the contractual 
obligations. Furthermore, there was no sign of any willingness of the Russian side to 
compromise. However, what is not covered by Sloss and Davis is the escalating 
nature of the Russian negotiation strategy. Nevertheless, this might be analogous to 
the Russian tendency to push for further concessions once a first concession is made 
by the other party. 
 
Payback Time 
After three months of being pushed by the Russians, Shell threw in the towel. On 11 
December 2006, Shell offered to sell a 25% stake plus blocking rights in Sakhalin-II to 
Gazprom. Furthermore, it agreed to pay for future cost overruns in the project, so 
that those costs would not fall upon Gazprom. Lastly, it promised to pay the Russian 
state some hundred million dollars for the environmental damage done.113 The 
Russian side was not satisfied with this deal and the next day it threatened to fine 
Shell 30 billion US dollars for violation of environmental standards.114 
 
The European Council convened on 14 and 15 December 2006 and again discussed 
the Sakhalin-II problems. Commission President Barroso informed participants that he 
had spoken with Moscow about the case. Again, no concerted European action 
was taken. 115  On 18 December 2006 both Shell and the Russian government 
announced progress in the negotiations and both said they expected an outcome 
in a few days. The deal was struck on 22 December 2006. Shell and its Japanese 
partner each sold 50% of their holdings to Gazprom for 7.45 billion US dollars in cash, 
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a sum below market price. The PSA was not changed. Shell did not get a stake in the 
Zapolyarnoye field.116 
 
Russia was the clear winner. Its proxy Gazprom obtained 50% plus one stock in the 
Sakhalin-II project, giving it final control over the project. It gained access to the 
latest technologies the consortium had employed there. Although Gazprom was not 
directly paid the royalties, it kept the Zapolyarnoye field under full control. On a 
higher political level, this meant that Russia now controlled future gas deliveries to 
East Asia. More important for the Russians was the restored national pride in the light 
of the humiliating experience of the Yeltsin era. Putin showed the world that Russia 
could do whatever it wanted domestically, humiliating and getting back at a 
prominent Western company that had tried to trick him.  He had even been able to 
divide and bully European leaders on their approach to the case. 
 
During this final stage of the negotiations, one can discern that the Russians became 
more and more extreme once Shell agreed to meet the first demands of the Russian 
government. According to the approach of Sloss and Davis, the Russians see the 
willingness to compromise as a weakness and therefore feel that they can get more 
out of the other party once it makes a first concession. 
 
Conclusion 
When analyzing the development of the negotiations, it becomes apparent that 
after the failure of the gas field swap, Russia was looking for revenge, due to the 
perceived ‘trick’ by Shell. Slowly it increased pressure on Shell by directly punishing it 
(excluding it from the Shtokman field) and signalling that the Sakhalin-II situation was 
not acceptable (the May 2006 report). On the other hand, it made ambiguous 
approaches to Shell, inviting the company to participate in the gas liquefying factory 
in Siberia, probably to puzzle Shell. Then, Russia threatened to withdraw the 
operating licenses due to environmental concerns. Once European politicians 
started exerting pressure on Russia, its leadership reacted against European wishes: 
they escalated the situation time and again, pushing Shell to desperation. Once Shell 
was openly ready to give in, the Russians pushed even further, with the threat of an 
enormous multi-billion fine for environmental damages. 
 
When these tactics and the general Russian approach to this situation are held in the 
light of the contentions made by Sloss and Davis on the characteristics of the Russian 
(Soviet) negotiation style, their assertions seems to be quite correct. Russia acted 
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against Shell, partly out of a sense of humiliation and the wish to be seen as equal 
partner in the West. Once Shell came forward with a concession, it was clearly 
‘pocketed’ and pushed for further concessions. Furthermore, Russia stated 
repeatedly that it would respect the original contract, just as it would have done 
according to Sloss and Davis. What was not covered by their assessment of the 
Russian negotiation style was the escalation in response to pressure by the other 
party. 
 
In these negotiations the EU played only a secondary role. This case study might be 
useful to the EU when it comes to the defence of the interests of ‘its’ companies 
operating in Russia. The drawback, however, is that there are no real ‘EU’ 
companies, mainly national companies (as Shell was primarily Anglo-Dutch, 
secondarily perhaps European). In case of business conflicts, this allows Russia (and 
any other third country) to play off one member state against another, and by 
creating divergences undermine the support the EU can give to its companies. This 
fundamental weakness is a serious drawback in any EU-Russia negotiation, where the 
Russian side will try to play on the signs of weakness of the EU side. Compromises are 
seen as weaknesses and do not fit in the Russian zero-sum paradigm. Instead of 
compromising, those who negotiate with the Russians should try to escalate if the 
Russians do not accept the first offer. On the other hand, it should constantly be 
shown to the Russians that if they want to be perceived as European, they should 
negotiate as Europeans, shifting towards a ‘win-win’ paradigm that allows for 
compromises to be created. Most of all, any European negotiator should have a 
clear mandate, resulting from ‘closed ranks’ among the member states. 
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IV. The Interaction of Political and Economic Objectives in the 
E.ON-Gazprom Asset-Swap Negotiations, 2004-2008 
Chloe Middleton  
 
 
Introduction: Political or Commercial Interests? 
On 2 October 2008 an asset-swap was signed between E.ON and Gazprom, 
concluding four years of negotiations. There was a distinct caesura midway through 
the process, after which the negotiating stakes were dramatically redefined. Whilst 
the Framework Agreement, signed in 2006, envisaged Gazprom acquiring E.ON 
downstream assets in a range of EU member states in exchange for E.ON acquiring a 
stake in the Siberian gas field Yuzhno Russkoye, the final deal involved the return of 
E.ON’s 49% stake in a Russian company, rather than its European downstream 
assets.117 The reasons for the failure to reach a settlement in line with the original 
Framework Agreement and for the radically different structure of the final 
agreement two years later remain unexamined. Gazprom has made no secret of its 
desire to acquire downstream assets and its recent ‘shopping spree’ in Europe has 
raised concerns over the company’s (and the Kremlin’s) potential political ambitions 
in those countries.118 The central conundrum of this asset-swap, however, which has 
been largely neglected by other analysts commenting on the case, 119 is why 
Gazprom relented on its demands on this occasion, given how keen it has been to 
secure European downstream assets in other cases. 
 
I argue that the breakdown of the Framework Agreement can be attributed to 
financial difficulties in valuing the respective assets involved in the swap. The need 
for Gazprom to maximise profit has been constantly downplayed, to the extent that 
the discussion about Gazprom’s motives in sealing deals with European firms focuses 
exclusively on the political dimension. Analysis of this case sheds light on how 
Gazprom actually negotiates with its European partners by looking at the interaction 
of motivation, process and outcome. 120 It suggests that far from “asset grabbing and 
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political meddling”,121 Gazprom’s priority in these negotiations was to gain maximum 
profit from the deal. European political circles have been so ready to ascribe to 
Gazprom political ambitions to dominate the European market, that this financial 
dimension has been almost entirely ignored.  
 
It is in any case impossible retrospectively to assess the intentions of negotiating 
parties in general. As the negotiation theorist Matz points out, these are always 
“many, multileveled, morphing, floating, dissolving”.122 Given this warning against 
imputing motive, the relative consensus about the two parties’ motives in press 
reports surrounding the E.ON-Gazprom case suggested that these needed to be 
treated with caution and that further research from a wider source base was 
required.123 This wider source base consists of telephone interviews with two E.ON 
employees involved in the negotiations and an independent analyst from an energy 
research centre, in addition to a review of media coverage.124   
 
Generally, international business negotiation takes place “outside the inter-state 
system, but is subject to its influence, while [it is] also a catalyst of new trends”.125 
Asset-swaps in the energy sector deviate from this definition because whilst the 
companies themselves sign the agreement, they are not entirely removed from the 
inter-state system, given the implications these deals have for a country’s energy 
security, for which the state is ultimately responsible. This is especially true of deals 
involving Gazprom, since the degree of state ownership and political influence in 
Gazprom is far greater than in its Western counterparts. The question in this particular 
deal is to establish how significant a role politics played compared to the two 
companies’ economic and strategic interests. Moreover, an analysis of the 
negotiating tactics, mutual perception and long history of trust between E.ON and 
Gazprom in a deal involving the swap of Russian upstream and European 
downstream assets is very relevant at a time when reciprocity between the EU and 
Russia in accessing one another’s energy markets is a highly controversial issue. On 
the one hand, Russia refuses to ratify the Energy Charter Treaty and has hindered 
European companies from accessing its upstream activities.126 On the other hand, 
the European Commission has responded to pressure from some member states and 
is attempting to restrict third-country access to European downstream assets, via the 
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contentious ‘Gazprom clause’ in its third legislative energy package.127 There are 
lessons the EU can draw from the Yuzhno Russkoye asset-swap, in understanding 
what political and economic conditions encourage openness to reciprocity on the 
part of Russia. 
 
The key events in the 2004-2008 asset-swap negotiations were as follows: 
 
Time line 
08.07.2004  Gazprom and E.ON seal a Memorandum of Understanding to deepen 
cooperation on strategic projects.128 
08.09.2005  E.ON, BASF and Gazprom sign the North European Gas Pipeline Agreement.129  
13.07.2006  A Framework Agreement is signed by Gazprom and E.ON to exchange 25% 
minus one share in Yuzhno Russkoye for E.ON downstream assets in Hungary.130 
mid-2006 to  Negotiations stall, E.ON seeks to adapt the package offered by adding assets  
end 2007  from other Eastern and Western European countries, including ones from E.ON 
UK.131 
25.10.07  Gazprom seals a deal with E.ON’s competitor BASF for a 25% stake in the field. 
02.08 A  ‘new concept’ for negotiations is launched by E.ON: E.ON to acquire same 
stake in Russian gas field in exchange for return of E.ON’s 49% stake in the 
Russian firm ZAO Gerosgaz, which holds just under 3% of Gazprom shares.132 
02.10.08  Asset-swap is signed in presence of state leaders Merkel and Medvedev. 
05.06.09   Alexej Miller, CEO of OAO Gazprom, and Bernhard Reutersberg, CEO of E.ON 




The decision to launch negotiations on the Yuzhno Russkoye gas field were just one 
outcome of an agreement in 2004 between E.ON Ruhrgas and Gazprom to 
cooperate more closely and more intensively.134 As these negotiations built on the 
two companies’ thirty-five year working relationship, they were very much part of a 
“process of continuous or post-agreement negotiation, [which] is needed to develop 
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and solidify long-term associations”.135 The companies were also seeking to “redefine 
the terms of their interdependence”136 via other negotiations occurring at the same 
time, such as the North European Gas Pipeline and the joint construction of a power 
station in Lubim, Germany.137 Success in one area therefore contributed to a wider 
building of trust. The thorniest issue from the outset was what E.ON could offer 
Gazprom in return for its stake in the gas field. 
  
E.ON’s Interests and Bidding Position at the Outset 
Germany lacks substantial gas reserves of its own and in 2006 depended on foreign 
gas imports to meet 83.6% of its needs.138 Given that foreign investors’ access to 
Russian upstream extraction projects has become more and more restricted,139 for 
E.ON, the prospect of jointly owning the Yuzhno Russkoye gas field represented a 
unique opportunity. The field’s 700 billion cubic meters of gas reserves could meet 
Germany’s entire gas requirement for ten years. 140  E.ON’s already irrevocable 
financial commitment to the construction of the Nord Stream pipeline, which would 
be supplied by the Yuzhno Russkoye gas field, meant the ‘cost of no agreement’ in 
this case was even higher. Finally, E.ON Ruhrgas could only meet its ambitious targets 
to increase its own gas production from 5% to 20% by sealing this deal.141 While E.ON 
undoubtedly created an atmosphere of trust and openness at the start of 
negotiations by laying all its cards on the table, this also weakened its negotiating 
position, enabling Gazprom to raise its demands, since it was well aware of how 
much the deal meant to its partners.  
 
Gazprom’s Interests and Tactics on Opening Negotiations 
Gazprom’s strategy to secure assets in European energy firms, including storage 
facilities and electricity production, may indeed have a strong political dimension. 
But as a state-owned company, Gazprom’s behaviour can always be interpreted as 
being ‘politically motivated’, which is in any case a very vague characterisation. The 
essence of Gazprom’s strategy is to achieve economic dominance, which will in turn 
ensure Russia’s position as a regional and global power. 142  The acquisition of 
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European downstream assets supports this strategy in two key ways. Firstly, it enables 
Gazprom to influence European companies which it partially owns in their choice of 
supplier, thereby maintaining Gazprom’s market share. Secondly, Gazprom stands to 
benefit from the considerable mark-up in the price of gas by selling directly to 
European consumers.  
 
Although E.ON’s initial openness put Gazprom in a strong negotiating position, the 
‘cost of no agreement’ was also very high for Gazprom, as it desperately needed 
German investment and technology in order to exploit the field. Russia’s 
underinvestment in its gas infrastructure is so serious that it has been criticised by the 
International Energy Agency. 143 On the day the deal was signed, the German 
Chancellor, Angela Merkel, sought to dispel any notion that the win-sets were 
asymmetrical, stating that “although Germany  has little in the way of natural 
resources, it has attractive technologies when it comes to  harnessing these 
resources”.144 Nevertheless, at the very start of these negotiations, Gazprom made it 
clear that they intended to set the rules of the game. BASF, E.ON’s German 
competitor, was also bidding for an equal stake in the Yuzhno Russkoye field, but 
Gazprom deliberately conducted these negotiations completely separately, a 
strategy which prevented any collaboration between the two German companies 
and may well have strengthened Gazprom’s position with each of them.145 Secondly, 
Gazprom resolutely insisted on an asset-swap, refusing to consider any other form of 
deal such as cash remuneration.146 In July 2006, significant progress was marked by 
the signing of a Framework Agreement, according to which Gazprom accepted 
stakes in E.ON’s Hungarian subsidiaries in exchange for granting E.ON a stake in 
Yuzhno Russkoye.147  
 
Why the Negotiations then Stalled 
The Framework Agreement was, however, not implemented, and over the next one 
and a half years, E.ON made numerous proposals to adapt the package of assets 
being offered to Gazprom. In August 2007 it even offered Gazprom its gas-to-power 
plants in the UK.148 Even now, it is unclear whether the talks broke down because of 
European political opposition or Russian objections to the assets being offered. 
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One possible explanation for the failure of the Framework Agreement and the 
subsequent modifications made to it is that E.ON experienced substantial political 
opposition to the deal. One media report mentioned opposition from the Hungarian 
government, which expressed concerns about being subject to Russian control, “as 
during Soviet times”.149 Even E.ON itself seems to have been apprehensive about the 
consequences of ceding shares to Russian control, when the possibility of Gazprom 
acquiring shares in E.ON Ruhrgas was briefly discussed in early 2006: a “Gazprom 
acquisition [in E.ON Ruhrgas] would place the Russians in a key position in the 
company and hinder the purchase of gas from other regions”. 150  The British 
government is said to have been wary about ‘embracing the Russian bear’ when 
Gazprom wanted to bid in a totally separate deal for a majority stake in Centrica.151 
However, coverage of Gazprom’s possible acquisition of E.ON UK assets only went as 
far as to say: “British politicians would face calls to resist a deal”.152 As far as the 
German government’s involvement is concerned, matters are even less clear cut. 
One newspaper reported that the government had ruled out in advance any 
Gazprom acquisition of European electricity networks.153 On the other hand, E.ON 
employees involved in the negotiations stated that the German government was 
very much “in the background” and gave the company “constant support”.154 
Given the confidential nature of the talks between governments and E.ON on such a 
high-profile international deal, it is very difficult to determine the extent of political 
opposition to the asset-swap, as originally envisaged.  
 
A prominent energy analyst gave a different explanation for the breakdown of talks 
following the Framework Agreement. He argued that although Gazprom may initially 
have been eager to acquire European downstream assets, these assets proved 
difficult to value precisely. This was in stark contrast with the Russian gas field, which 
made up the other side of the asset-swap and could be valued with far greater 
certainty.155 The importance of these economic factors, involving very considerable 
sums, should not be underestimated. It was crucial for Gazprom to be certain that it 
was obtaining sufficient financial compensation, given its dire need for capital – 
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“even before the oil price fell (bringing down the gas price too), Gazprom had the 
highest costs and worst finances of any international gas company”.156 In order to 
improve its financial position, the company was amenable to the alteration of the 
framework of the deal.  
 
An additional cause for the hiatus in negotiations, suggested by sources within E.ON, 
was the rise in oil prices, to which gas prices are linked.157 Prices had been rising 
steadily since 2000, but in 2006 the rate of increase had accelerated to such a 
degree that the gas field was worth far more than the package of Hungarian assets 
offered by E.ON.158 It remains unclear why E.ON’s offers to ‘bridge the gap’ in value 
by including assets in Western Europe were not accepted. Whilst there was probably 
some political resistance, Gazprom seems to have been employing salami tactics, 
exploiting the difficulty in valuing downstream assets as a means of repeatedly 
increasing its demands by a small amount.  
 
The Redefined Asset-Swap and Why It Succeeded 
The beginning of the exploration of the gas field in December 2007 made the need 
to find a solution and seal a deal more urgent. The impasse was broken in February 
2008 by E.ON boldly proposing a swap of completely different assets, shares in the 
Russian company ZAO Gerosgaz rather than European downstream assets.159 This 
assertive move strengthened E.ON’s position, enabling E.ON Ruhrgas’ chairman, 
Reutersberg, to increase the time pressure and even threaten to “drop the idea of 
buying a stake in [Yuzhno Russkoye] if […] Gazprom rejects its new offer”, according 
to one report.160 E.ON explains that this initiative succeeded because it overcame 
the problems caused by the fluctuating gas price. According to E.ON, changes in 
the gas price would have a commensurate effect on both the value of the Yuzhno 
Russkoye gas field and the shares in ZAO Gerosgaz,161 a correlation which others 
have claimed is weak.162  
 
A more plausible explanation for the success of the reformulated agreement is that 
the assets that Gazprom was to receive were more certain and tangible163 since 
E.ON’s return of its stake in Gerosgaz is indirectly a return of 3% of its stake in 
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Gazprom.164 This also conveniently aligned with the Russian government’s policy of 
bringing energy companies under state control. This policy is, however, economically 
as well as ideologically motivated. The “Russian government has an insatiable 
demand for capital” because of the inefficiency of the Russian tax system,165 and 
income from renationalised assets in the energy sector has been the government’s 
only guarantee of much-needed revenue. In light of this, E.ON’s new offer was very 
attractive. Gazprom’s readiness to accept the new terms of the agreement and to 
effectively abandon its demand for European downstream assets suggests that their 
primary objective was to maximise economic gain from the E.ON negotiations. Any 
desire for political influence in the European market was secondary.  
 
On E.ON’s part too, there is clear evidence that economic incentives strongly 
prevailed over any political influence, especially after the launch of the redefined 
asset-swap. Even if the German government had intervened during the first phase of 
negotiations, the timing of the deal, in the context of other major world events, 
strongly suggests that E.ON did not meet with any strong political opposition in the 
second phase in 2008. International criticism that Europe should consider alternatives 
to Nord Stream and projects linked to it following the Russian invasion of Georgia166 
precipitated no response from the German government. Given Merkel’s formerly 
more hard-line approach towards Russia than her predecessor Gerhard Schröder, 
her approval of the agreement seems surprising. Not only did she “realise which side 
her bread is buttered on”,167 but her separation of energy security from shorter term 
political concerns and decision to consent to the deal at a time of high political 
tensions constitutes a clear case of Realpolitik.168 The closure of the deal less than 
two months after the Caucasian conflict, which threw Russo-EU political relations into 
chaos is evidence of the relatively insignificant role that inter-state politics played in 
actually shaping the final outcome.  
 
Conclusion 
Whilst it is clear that both parties profited from the deal, it is less straightforward to 
determine which party gained more or had to compromise more on their initial 
objectives. Despite a weak negotiating position at the outset, E.ON managed to 
achieve its principal goal of participating in the gas field. Critics have tried to lessen 
E.ON’s success by claiming it “is paying significantly more than BASF spent on its 
interest last year”.169 Not only does this fail to account for the different range of 
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upstream assets, which BASF could offer Gazprom,170 but it also focuses singularly on 
outcome and not the negotiating process. E.ON’s lack of a real alternative for 
developing an upstream joint venture to supply Nord Stream increased its depen-
dency on Gazprom. This placed Gazprom in a strong negotiating position, which it 
initially took advantage of by refusing to accept each progressive increase in E.ON’s 
offer. The success of the redefined asset-swap can be attributed to E.ON’s initiative 
to completely redesign the assets it offered Gazprom. The nature of these assets also 
overlapped considerably with the Russian win-set, despite the fact that this was far 
removed from Gazprom’s initial demand.  
 
The signing of two deals that enable two German companies to acquire a 25% stake 
each in a strategically vital gas field are landmark cases for European energy 
security because they show that Russia is potentially open to reciprocity. The Yuzhno 
Russkoye asset-swap reveals two fundamental lessons for Europe concerning the 
conditions which favour this type of deal. Firstly, it is highly significant that Gazprom 
signed a deal with E.ON Ruhrgas, a partner with which it (and its predecessor the 
Soviet Ministry of Gas) has worked for thirty-five years, rather than any other 
European company. It was the trust created by this long-term relationship, and the 
promise of future cooperation after the deal, which made both sides persevere until 
a mutually favourable deal was reached, even when negotiations were at a 
complete standstill. Secondly, although Gazprom’s initial demand for downstream 
assets in Europe certainly had both political and economic motivations, Gazprom’s 
readiness to accept E.ON’s proposed redefined asset-swap and abandon its former 
claims, indicates that a desire for influence within European companies was not its 
m a i n  o b j e c t i v e ,  c o n t r a r y  t o  a s s e r t i o n s  m a d e  b y  t h e  W e s t e r n  m e d i a .  E u r o p e a n  
governments may well have intervened during the first phase of the negotiations, 
voicing concerns about Gazprom’s downstream ambitions, but Gazprom’s 
negotiating behaviour suggests its real priority was different. Far from being staunchly 
set on dominating European markets, Gazprom’s eagerness to acquire European 
downstream assets was diminished by its realisation that they could not be valued 
easily and their profitability was uncertain. As Güllner points out, state-controlled 
companies do not necessarily behave as state actors,171 a point well illustrated in this 
case, where Gazprom ultimately remained a commercial actor, principally driven by 
profit maximisation.   
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Relations between the European Union and the Russian Federation are based on the 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) which came into force on in 1997 for 
an initial duration of ten years and is automatically extended beyond 2007 on an 
annual basis, unless either side withdraws from the agreement. A mandate for 
negotiations towards a new bilateral agreement was agreed in May 2008 after long 
discussions between EU member states, marked by a veto crisis caused by Poland 
and Lithuania. Soon after launching the negotiations, due to Russia’s 
“disproportionate reaction” 172  during the crisis in Georgia, the process was 
postponed.173 On 10 November 2008 the EU foreign ministers decided to reopen the 
negotiations. Since then, there have been two EU-Russia summits at the highest 
political level and five rounds of technical negotiations – both of them without any 
remarkable results. Instead, the prospects for an agreement about the most 
important and at the same time disputed issues concerning energy supplies and 
trade regulations have deteriorated. Disagreements over the ‘common 
neighbourhood’ provoke crises both small and large every few months, and the 
situation in Georgia and its separatist republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia is still 
unstable. Thus, taking into account the previous obstacles and actual symptoms of 
the deep divergences among the parties, one can argue that the negotiations over 
the new agreement will be rather long, and the result remains uncertain.  
 
In this essay I apply Putnam’s two-level game approach174 to explain why the pre-
negotiations among the EU member states encountered so many obstacles at the 
very beginning and why it is likely that these problems may be also transposed on 
the international level of negotiations. Likewise, I analyse why Russia, having strong 
economic and political interest in boosting relations with the EU, is such a difficult 
and unpredictable negotiating partner. I argue that although the win-sets of both 
parties could objectively overlap, there are many factors that make the outcome of 
EU-Russia negotiations uncertain.  
 
                                                 
172 Council of the European Union, ‘Presidency Conclusions - Extraordinary European Council, 
Brussels, 1 September 2008’, Brussels, 6 October 2008.  
173 ‘Postponed’ and not ‘suspended’, therefore legally there was no need for unanimity in the 
Council, and Lithuania, although it did not agree to reopen the negotiations, could not veto 
the decision.  
174  Robert D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games’, 
International Organization, vol. 42, no. 3, 1988, pp. 427- 460. 
  43 EU Diplomacy Paper 8/2009 
I adapt Putnam’s theory to a three-level framework. Firstly, I will analyse the win-set of 
the EU as such and then in the second part I will move to the member states’ 
perspective. The third part will deal with the examination of the Russian position. In 
addition, each section contains some observations on the negotiating behaviour of 
the parties, being to a great extent the consequence of the room of manoeuvre 
delimited by their win-sets. In the conclusion I will show that the prospects for quick 
and effective negotiations over a new bilateral agreement between Russia and the 
EU are rather limited. Nevertheless, the new international context created by the 
international financial crisis may lead to some changes in the negotiating positions, 
thereby generating more chances for a positive outcome.  
 
The EU Win-Set 
Taking into account the latest Commission review of EU-Russia relations, emphasizing 
the interdependence of the European and Russian economies and “the complex 
web of overlapping and shared interests”,175 one could argue that, at least from the 
EU’s perspective, a positive outcome of the negotiations on a new agreement is 
desirable and very probable. According to the report, “Russia is an important 
emerging market […] that offers opportunities to EU enterprises, […] a significant 
share of the Russian foreign exchange reserves are held in euro, making Russia one 
of the largest holders of euro-denominated assets in the world”, and finally “the 
energy sector is a core element of the relationship”,176 for Russia as a supplier and for 
the EU as a consumer.  
 
Moreover, as one of the major actors on the international scene and in particular in 
the post-Soviet area, Russia plays a key role in the peaceful and sustainable solution 
of many conflicts in Europe and its boundaries.  Effective cooperation between the 
EU and Russia is crucial to achieving greater economic and political stability in the 
‘common neighbourhood’. The European Union needs a constructive engagement 
of its biggest neighbour to solve problems in Iran, Transnistria, the Middle East, 
Nagorno-Karabakh or Georgia and its separatist republics. Therefore, it is in the very 
best interest of the EU to continue its efforts to conclude the new agreement with 
Russia, which can serve as a basis for enhanced cooperation. However, despite 
obvious mutual benefits of good relations between Moscow and Brussels, there are 
several crucial problems which hinder reaching an agreement. The main areas of 
conflicts concern the energy sector, ‘common neighbourhood’ and the question of 
democracy and human rights in Russia.  
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In the field of energy, the European Union would like to build a mature strategic 
partnership with Russia based on the “enshrining principles of the Energy Charter 
Treaty”.177 Yet, the document setting out a non-discriminatory regime for the energy 
market based on WTO principles goes against the Russian interests. Although Russia 
signed the Energy Charter in 1994, it has systematically refused to ratify it. Instead, it 
proposed its own version based on the status quo with the monopolistic position of 
the Russian companies on the European market and refused to grant access to the 
domestic market for the European companies. Finally, on 30 July 2009 Vladimir Putin 
declared the withdrawal of the Russian Federation from the Energy Charter Treaty.178 
 
Another area of disagreement is the European engagement in the so-called 
‘common neighbourhood’. Russia perceives the European Neighbourhood Policy 
and especially the recent initiative of the Eastern Partnership – covering the six 
former Soviet republics Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and 
Ukraine – as a quasi-enlargement policy endangering Russian interests in its 
immediate vicinity. 
 
The last problem is more general and derives from the fundamental and growing 
discrepancy between the European and Russian models of governance. Over the 
last few years, Russia evolved from a weak transition democracy to a much stronger 
state building its own version of ‘sovereign democracy’ as some have it, 179 or 
heading towards an authoritarian regime, as it is called by others. Whatever the 
name, the Russian system differs from European democratic standards and this has 
consequences for the bilateral relations. The EU as an active promoter of values 
undertook the commitment to include a human rights clause as an essential element 
of all international agreements with wide-ranging and political content.180 It means 
that in case of human rights violations, each of the parties may suspend 
implementation of the agreement. Russia clearly emphasises that it will not accept 
any attempts to base its relationship with the EU on conditionality, normally used 
towards developing countries or as a pre-accession instrument. Thus, the EU’s desire 
to base the new agreement on “recognition of common values such as democracy, 
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human rights and the rule of law”181 may end as an empty political statement. The 
most visible examples of how far from each other the European and Russian visions of 
cooperation are were the gas crisis in Ukraine and the war in Georgia. These two 
events “seriously undermined the level of trust”182 between the EU and Russia and 
put their relationship again at a cross-roads.183 
                                                
 
Despite these obstacles, the European Commission insists that dialogue between the 
parties should continue, as it is the best way to discuss disagreements and gives the 
EU the possibility to propose some trade-offs such as visa facilitation and financial aid, 
which can help the EU to achieve its objectives with Russia. 184 Therefore, the 
Commission proposes that the new agreement provide “an updated and more 
ambitious framework for the EU-Russia relationship”.185 It should be legally binding186 
and cover all main areas of cooperation based on the four common spaces.187 
Once the Russian Federation becomes a member of the WTO, the EU envisages 
establishing a Free Trade Area (FTA), which requires mutual acceptance of the high 
standards and rules of the international trade system.  
 
The evaluation of the EU’s interest and demonstrated will to pursue negotiations with 
Russia despite many obstacles seems to clearly indicate that the EU’s win-set is quite 
large, which makes the agreement more likely. In fact the complexity of the EU 
treaty-making system makes the number of acceptable agreements with Russia 
rather limited. The PCA is a mixed agreement and the Commission is pushing for a 
new, comprehensive bilateral treaty with Russia which would have certain 
implications.188 Firstly, this kind of agreement requires a consensus among member 
states to give to the Commission a mandate to launch, conduct and conclude 
negotiations.189 Secondly, the agreement needs to be ratified by the Council, the 
European Parliament (especially after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty) and 
all member states, according to their national ratification procedures. The problems 
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with reaching a consensus on the negotiating mandate and disputes around the 
reopening of the talks proved that member states are extremely divided in their 
positions towards Russia. The heterogeneous preferences around the EU’s domestic 
negotiating table makes its win-set rather limited. 
 
In consequence, the European Commission becomes a very tough negotiator, 
having limited room for manoeuvre when acting within the precise mandate, and it 
is therefore not prone to make concessions. At the same time it is difficult for the 
Commission to play a pro-active role in the negotiations190 as any new offer put on 
the table must have an acceptance from all 27 member states, which are briefed 
before and after each negotiating round. Moreover, the Commission’s credibility as 
a negotiator may be undermined if it is not able to promise ratification at home. The 
EU’s negotiating position is a result of complicated domestic negotiations based on 
the smallest common denominator. 
 
The EU Member States’ Perspective 
On 10 November 2008, the foreign ministers of the EU decided to proceed with the 
negotiations with Russia over a new agreement. However, they did not manage to 
reach a unanimous position because of Lithuania’s resistance.191 Lack of consensus 
among member states is not an unusual situation when the question of EU-Russia 
relations is on the table. Different economic interests and political perspectives, plus 
geographical location and difficult historical experiences, shape national positions 
vis-à-vis Russia. The categorisation proposed by Leonard and Popescu, although 
controversial, could be useful to understand the complex system of preferences 
within the EU.192 T h e y  d i f f e r e n t i a t e  f i v e  g r o u p s  o f  c o u n t r i e s  o n  t h e  b a s i s  o f  t h e i r  
attitude towards Russia: Trojan horses (Cyprus and Greece) often defend Russian 
interests in the EU; strategic partners (France, Spain, Germany, Italy) have ‘special 
relations’ with Russia sometimes going across or even against common EU policy; 
friendly pragmatics (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Finland, Luxemburg, Malta, Portugal, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary) have close relations with Russia and sometimes are 
prone to set their own economic interests above EU political objectives; cold 
pragmatics (Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Netherlands, Ireland, Latvia, 
Romania, Sweden, UK) are also focused on their interests, however, they are not 
afraid of criticizing Russia; new Cold War fighters (Poland and Lithuania) have cold 
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relations with Russia and if unsatisfied, they are ready to block negotiations between 
the EU and Russia.193 The most powerful groups influencing EU-Russia relations are the 
Cold War fighters, sometimes supported by Sweden and the UK, and the strong 
group of strategic partners.   
 
Poland and Lithuania had already blocked the talks over a new agreement with 
Russia at the very beginning, when they alternately vetoed the Council mandate for 
the Commission to start negotiations. The reasons for such behaviour derive from their 
historical background and are reconfirmed by the Russian embargo on the Polish 
agricultural products on a very flimsy pretext or the Russian use of blackmail towards 
those countries highly dependent on Russian energy supplies. Therefore, Poland and 
Lithuania were challenging Russia, but also European solidarity, trying a linkage 
strategy by raising conditions for the launch of negotiations with Moscow (for 
example, Russia’s ratification of the Energy Charter and the Transit Protocol or the 
inclusion in the mandate of a commitment to protect human rights and to 
cooperate with Brussels in solving ‘frozen conflicts’ in Georgia and Moldova). 
  
The second group, even though it sometimes shares those concerns,194 is more in 
favour of the ‘double-track’ policy towards Russia, which means moderate criticism 
when it is necessary but continuation of doing ‘business as usual’. France, Germany 
and Italy, pushed by their own business circles searching for better access to the 
Russian market, represent this pragmatic approach. They have the advantage of 
good bilateral relations which could be an alternative to the common EU agreement. 
The ‘cost of no agreement’ for them is then relatively low. In this case, why do they 
strongly support the negotiations? The possible explanation is that in multilateral 
negotiations they have a stronger position, as they may use ‘rebel countries’ (Poland 
and Lithuania) as a leverage to put pressure on Russia and thereby obtain some 
concessions.195 
 
The provisional conclusion that can be drawn so far is that the divisions among EU 
member states and the high politicisation of their relations with Russia make the EU’s 
win-set quite small. Nevertheless, the EU can easily lose this surplus in negotiations by 
immersing itself in internal disputes. However, if the EU manages to achieve a general 
consensus, it can make use of the leverage of its diversity. The strategic partners 
should conduct negotiations in a friendly way, which may weaken the vigilance of 
                                                 
193 Ibid.  
194 “In this particular case […] everyone is glad Poland has remained true to its reputation as a 
rebel" in Frank Herold, ‘Erwünschtes Bremsmanöver Polens’, Berliner Zeitung, 14 November 
2006. 
195 Ibid. 
  48 Paul Meerts (ed.)  
the Russian negotiators, whereas the troublemakers should serve as a backup of 
assertive criticism, when necessary.  
 
The Russian Position 
From the Russian point of view there are several, mainly economic reasons why the 
Russian government should be in favour of an enhanced co-operation with the EU, 
based on a new bilateral agreement. First of all, the Russian budget is strongly 
dependent on the income from selling energy mostly on the EU market. Although the 
Kremlin sometimes tries to blackmail its European partners by threatening to turn its 
priorities towards Asia, such a re-orientation is hardly possible due to lack of technical 
infrastructure and lower energy prices on Asian markets.196 Secondly, the on-going 
financial crisis showed that the Russian economy, relying on high prices of gas and oil, 
needs a modernisation in order to avoid ‘the Dutch disease’. The first symptoms are 
already visible: due to low hydrocarbon prices the deficit of the Russian budget has 
risen to nearly 10%, while economic growth is down and unemployment is growing.197 
In addition, Russian leaders are becoming more conscious of the fact that their 
European partners are heading towards a diversification of energy supplies by 
supporting initiatives like the Southern Corridor, which will connect Europe with new 
producers in the Middle East, South Caucasus or Central Asia. The Russian 
government is trying hard to divide the EU and torpedo this initiative, promoting 
instead its own rival project, the South Stream. However, on the horizon there is 
another threat for the Russian position on the European energy market, namely the 
growing sector of green technologies, in which the EU has a leading position. Finally, 
the expanding Chinese economic and political influence in the world, and in 
particular in Central Asia, is being observed with increasing concern by the 
Kremlin.198 
 
To face all these threats Russia needs to modernise its economy. Russian leaders are 
much more aware of this fact than just few months ago. President Medvedev frankly 
admitted that “we cannot develop like this any further. It is a dead end. We will have 
to make decisions on changing the structure of the economy. Otherwise, our 
economy has no future”. 199 For that reason, Russia should eagerly accept the 
European helping hand. The EU can provide tools such as technical and financial 
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assistance to conduct reforms as well as access to the EU market and in a longer 
perspective the creation of a free trade zone, once Russia has acceded to the WTO. 
 
The general compatibility between the Russian interest and the European offer of 
cooperation allows us to make the assumption that the Russian win-set is quite large 
and has a good chance of overlapping with the European one. Moreover, 
according to Putnam, “strong discipline within the governing party, increases the 
win-set”.200 Therefore, in the case of Russia, where the president and the government 
have strong support in the parliament, the range of the agreements which can be 
expected to be ratified is wide. In other words, the Russian domestic level is 
characterised by a submissive attitude towards the executive power which is 
negotiating on the international arena.  
 
However, this does not mean that we can talk about strictly homogenous 
preferences in Russia concerning relations with the EU. The attitudes of Russian elites 
towards the EU, and more generally towards the West, are aggregated within two 
extreme camps, which shape the traditional debate on the Russia’s identity and its 
role in the world. The first group, so-called zapadniki (Occidentalists) believe that 
Russia is a specific part of Europe and the West and therefore should integrate with 
it.201 The other group derives from the Eurasiatic strand in Russian political thought 
which underlines the unique position of Russia in the world as a bridge between the 
East and the West, which is however very different from them and therefore cannot 
fully integrate with them but rather cooperate only on the basis of equal rights.202 The 
pro-integrationists were very influential at the beginning of the 1990s203, but their 
foreign policy was discredited at the end of President Yeltsin’s term and they were 
removed from mainstream politics by his successor, Vladimir Putin. Yet, with the 
economic crisis, they are again becoming more visible in the public discourse 
pointing out that “if Russia is to become a competitive economy, it has no choice 
but to open up to the world, join the WTO, and become a more liberal society with 
strong institutions providing for checks and balances”.204 
 
Nevertheless, the conservative camp, including the siloviki  (the military-security 
complex), still seems to have greater control over the Russian foreign policy. Their 
vision of international relations is based on the realist paradigm of power. Thus, 
according to them, Russia is a sovereign power with a specific role and interests in 
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the post-Soviet area, which should be treated as the Russian zone of influence. The 
concept of the ‘near abroad’ is reflected in Russia’s external security doctrine, which 
seems to legitimise the right to intervene in the domestic affairs of neighbouring 
countries in order to defend Russian political and economic interests.205 The most 
visible examples were Russian engagement in the campaign before the Ukrainian 
presidential elections in 2004 and the recent Georgian crisis. The ‘near abroad’ 
overlaps with the EU’s neighbourhood, which together with the energy dossier is the 
main source of disagreement between Brussels and Moscow. 
 
In consequence, the Russian version of Realpolitik has a predominant impact on the 
perception of the European Union and the vision of EU-Russia relations. The EU is 
treated not as a community built on shared values, but rather a new version of the 
Concert of Europe,206 which dangerously increases its activities near the Russian 
borders. The proof of the expansionist intentions of the EU is the European 
Neighbourhood Policy. This realist perception affects the Russian attitude towards the 
negotiations with the EU over a new agreement. Although from the perspective of 
the general economic interest and the internal institutional architecture the Russian 
win-set should be quite large, the adverse domestic preferences narrow it down. 
Therefore, Russian negotiators take a strong conservative line, applying some 
traditional Russian bargaining tactics.  
 
First of all, Russians perceive negotiations as a ‘war’ in peacetime,207 which implies 
that the ‘winner takes all’, concessions are signs of weakness and compromise is not 
considered as the best option of solving a problem. The PCA signed in 1994, when 
Russia was a weak country in transition, “was based on the EU’s conception of how 
its neighbourhood relations should be organized”208 and therefore is perceived by 
Russians as a failure. The original PCA does not correspond to the current situation, 
where Russia is again an economically and politically powerful player on the 
international scene. The new negotiation process is therefore considered a chance 
for Russia to assert its position and to change the existing legal framework into 
something new, which will reflect the equality between the two parties.  
 
However, the Russian vision of what the new agreement should look like seems to be 
quite different from the EU’s proposal to sign a new comprehensive treaty, including 
especially energy and trade issues. Sergey Lavrov, the Russian foreign minister, 
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specified that Russia and the EU should first sign a “strategic cooperation 
agreement” which would serve as a framework for any other future sectoral 
treaties.209 This approach is known as ‘agreement in principle’, which for Russians is 
the most important part of the negotiations. ‘Agreement in principle’ tends to be a 
vague political declaration, which is considered by Russian negotiators as “nothing 
but promise”210 and can be interpreted according to circumstances or even revised 
during the implementation process. Signing a general political treaty in lieu of the 
comprehensive agreement would serve three main goals. First of all, it would allow 
Russians to avoid linking the trade issues with the human rights and democracy 
clause that the EU includes in every treaty signed with a third country. Secondly, it 
would put energy dialogue with the EU outside the main negotiations. Whereas for 
the EU regulation in the field of energy supplies according to the principles of the 
Energy Charter and Transit Protocol is one of the main points of the negotiations, 
Russia is definitely interested in maintaining the status quo and inhibiting the 
liberalisation of the European market. For the moment, the energy dialogue is 
‘frozen’ by the Russian government’s decision to withdraw from the Energy Charter 
Treaty announced by Prime Minister Vladimir Putin in a decree on 30 July 2009.211  
 
Finally, the general agreement is related to the question of the Russian accession to 
the WTO. Russia has sought WTO membership since 1993 and, as high Russian officials 
underline, it is perceived as a strategic goal of foreign policy.212 Brussels supports 
these endeavours and would like to see EU-Russia trade relations governed by WTO 
rules as soon as possible to thereafter establish a free trade agreement. Although on 
4 June 2009, the EU and Russia had a “common under-standing” that WTO accession 
should be completed before the end of this year, 213 on 9 June Vladimir Putin 
announced that Russia will create a customs union with Belarus and Kazakhstan,214 
which will certainly postpone accession. This radical shift, very characteristic of the 
Russian negotiation style, may be a test of the determination and strength of the 
negotiators on the other side of the table. Russia wants to either postpone its 
membership in the WTO, which will allow it to continue to use protectionist trade 
measures, or to put pressure on its partners to accept Russian conditions of the 
accession. Thus, the declaration of the creation of the customs union with Belarus 
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and Kazakhstan may just be pokazukha (something what is done for show), a tactic 
used by Russians in order to make negotiations advantageous for them.215 In any 
case, Moscow prefers to play this game when it is not directly related to any 
important issues, thereby preventing the EU from using the linkage strategy to extract 
concessions from the Russian side. This creates a stalemate in the negotiations, 
because the EU insists that it will not sign a new strategic pact with Russia unless the 
country enters the WTO. Moscow is playing the role of a tough negotiator, trying to 
convince its European partners that the new agreement is of no great importance to 
the Russian Federation, as there are alternative solutions. According to the legal 
provisions, the old PCA can be prolonged automatically every year, unless one party 
gives notice.216 The message from the Kremlin is clear: either the new agreement will 
be tailored to Russian conditions, which means inter alia no references to ‘internal’ 
issues such as human rights protection or the rule of law, or there is no chance it will 
be signed. Moreover, Russia emphasises that it is ready to enhance cooperation with 
those EU countries respecting Russian interests,217 meaning with ‘strategic partners’ 
such as France or Germany; ‘Russophobe’ countries, like Poland and Lithuania will 
be left alone. 
 
Russians mastered the old technique divide et impera, exploiting even the smallest 
differences among member states. “Split, split and split again”218 is the major rule in 
many European initiatives of the Russian government or public companies. The gas 
crisis, projects for the North and South Stream, EU relations with Belarus, Georgia and 
Ukraine, or the Polish ‘meat affair’ are just a few examples of cases in which Russia 
tried or is trying to heat up the internal EU disputes. The tactic remains successful as 
long as the EU has problems with implementing a common EU policy towards Russia. 
Yet, paradoxically, the Ukrainian gas crisis or the Georgian war may convince the 
extreme groups within the EU that only a united and assertive position will be heard 
and taken into account by the Russian partners. Russians negotiate in a tough way, 
often having high demands at the beginning and spinning out the talks to the very 
last moment. Nevertheless, the EU approach towards the crisis during the Orange 
Revolution or the ‘meat affair’ proved that a strong and ‘single voice’ is a key factor 
to convince Russians to take a more consensual position.  
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The Russian tactic in these negotiations remains ambiguous. On the one hand, “a 
stronger, pragmatic and more confident Russia […] prefers to keep its hands free 
and options open in order to maximise its economic and geopolitical interests”.219 
Then, it is clear that stronger relationships with selected European partners and the 
weak old PCA are a real and advantageous alternative to ‘no agreement’. On the 
other hand, Russia could also be afraid that eventually the EU will maintain a strong 
unanimous position, and therefore Moscow will have to find a modus vivendi for its 
relations with the EU. In this case, it could use the tactic of being misleading about its 
own win-set in order to obtain a stronger bargaining position. 
 
Conclusion  
The perspectives for quick and effective negotiations over a new bilateral 
agreement between Russia and the EU are rather dim. Although due to economic 
interests the Russian and European win-sets could overlap, there are several factors 
on both sides which reduce the possibility of a successful outcome. On the EU side, 
divisions in member states’ positions towards Russia narrow down the European win-
set. Russia uses ambiguous bargaining tactics, trying to give the impression it is not 
interested in concluding the new agreement, while this is not necessarily the case. 
Moreover, apart from disagreements about the details, the European and Russian 
visions of the current situation and the nature of the future relationship seem to be 
completely divergent. For both parties, the question remains highly politicised, which 
makes the negotiations even more complicated.  
 
Yet, despite many differences, the two big European neighbours have a common 
interest in building a new effective model of cooperation. Currently, a new ‘window 
o f  o p p o r t u n i t y ’  i s  b e i n g  o p e n e d  b y  t h e  c h a n g i n g  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  w o r l d  o r d e r .  T h e  
economic crisis has weakened the economies of the EU, Russia and the US, while 
seeing the rise of new Chinese power. This raises concerns especially in Russia, which 
perceives China as a dangerous rival in Central Asia. The new situation may create 
an impulse for reshuffling positions around the negotiation table. The first sign may be 
President Medvedev’s announcement of “evolutionary, but consistent and 
irreversible reforms” in Russian politics. 220  Brussels should make the best of the 
momentum and push for accelerating the talks over the new agreement. Taking 
lessons from the previous negotiating experiences, the EU should develop a common 
position in order to strengthen its bargaining position and put through its agenda. This 
would require granting some safeguards or side-payments, possibly concerning 
energy security, in order to satisfy the most sceptical member states. The most 
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difficult question to deal with at the negotiating table with Moscow will be the 
inclusion of a conditionality clause.  
 
During the previous talks Russians proved many times that they seem to have more 
respect for the ‘argument of strength’ than the strength of arguments. They are also 
very sensible on the question of equal status of the negotiating parties. Therefore, the 
EU’s negotiation strategy should be based on a clear, united and assertive position, 
emphasizing at the same time the mutual benefits of a treaty. European negotiators 
should try to get out of the zero-sum game context in favour of package deals. The 
result of the negotiating process will depend a lot on the political will of both sides; 
whether in this new context Russia will become a constructive partner, or whether on 
the contrary it will stick to its rigid position, perceiving any concession from the EU as 
a success of its own strategy. The reward for the effort made by both sides may be 
the establishment of a real, not virtual, ‘strategic partnership’.  
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